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Introduction by Rizosfera
Tony D. Sampson is reader in digital media culture 
and communication based in East London, and deals 
with philosophy, digital culture and new media. His 
work focuses on an unconventional intersection where 
political analysis meets the theoretical aspects of digital 
media and social behaviour, shaping the world of our 
contemporary era. Writing on substantial components 
like viruses, virality in communication, contagion and 
behavioural imitation, the brain and neuroculture in 
this “rotten world” built on an accelerated bond of te-
chnology and ideology of value and profit driven mar-
kets, Sampson catches, with a forward looking attitude, 
some “substantial issues” of the clash between control 
and technology, society and individual or collective fre-
edom, shaping him not only as a brilliant new media 
theorist but as an essential political thinker as well. To 
scan his new book ‘The Assemblage Brain’ (Minneso-
ta Press, 2017) is therefore urgent to understand the 
important challenge we will face in a very near future.
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Digital Neuroland.  
    An Interview with Tony. D. Sampson
by Rizosfera
@ Obsolete Capitalism blog
 
1) Let’s start with your first book, published in 2009, The Spam Book 
edited in collaboration with Jussi Parikka, a compendium from the Dark 
Side of Digital Culture. Why did you feel the urge to investigate the bad 
sides of digital culture as a writing debut? In the realm of “spam” seen 
as an intruder, an excess, an anomaly, and a menace, you have met the 
“virus” which has characterized your research path up until today.
As I recall Jussi and I jokingly framed The Spam Book as the 
antithesis to Bill Gates’ Road Ahead, but our dark side perspec-
tive was not so much about an evil “bad” side. It was more about 
shedding some light on digital objects that were otherwise ob-
scured by discourses concerning security and epidemiological 
panics that rendered objects “bad”. So our introduction is really 
about challenging these discursively formed “bad” objects; these 
anomalous objects and events that seem to upset the norms of 
corporate networking.
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We were also trying to escape the linguistic syntax of the bi-
ological virus, which defined much of the digital contagion dis-
course at the time, trapping the digital anomaly in the biological 
metaphors of epidemiology and Neo-Darwinism. This is some-
thing that I’ve tried to stick to throughout my writings on the 
viral, however, in some ways though I think we did stay with the 
biological metaphor to some extent in The Spam Book, but tried 
to turn it on its head so that rather than point to the nasty bits 
(spam, viruses, worms) as anomalous threats, we looked at the 
viral topology of the network in terms of horror autotoxicus or 
autoimmunity. That is, the very same network that is designed to 
share information becomes this auto-destructive vector for con-
tagion. But beyond that, the anomaly is also constitutive of net-
work culture. For example, the computer virus determines what 
you can and can’t do on a network. In a later piece we also point-
ed to the ways in which spam and virus writing had informed 
online marketing practices. (1)
In this context we were interested in the potential of the acci-
dental viral topology. Jussi’s Digital Contagions looked at Virilio’s 
flipping of the substance/accident binary and I did this Trans-
formations journal article on accidental topologies, so we were, I 
guess, both trying get away from prevalent discursive formations 
(e.g. the wonders of sharing versus the perils of spam) and look 
instead to the vectorial capacities of digital networks in which 
various accidents flourished.
2) Virality, Contagion Theory in the Age of Networks came out in 
2012. It is an important essay which enables readers to understand vi-
rality as a social theory of the new digital dominion from a philosophical, 
sociological and political point of view (with the help of thinkers like Tar-
de and Deleuze). The path moves from the virus (the object of research) to 
the viral action (the spreading in social network areas to produce drives) 
to the contagion (the hypnotic theory of collective behaviour). How does 
the virus act in digital field and in the web? And how can we control 
spreading and contagion?
Before answering these specific questions, I need to say how 
important Tarde is to this book. Even the stuff on Deleuze and 
Guattari is really only read through their homage to Tarde. His 
contagion theory helped me to eschew biological metaphors, 
like the meme, which are discursively applied to nonbiological 
contexts. More profoundly Tarde also opens up a critical space 
wherein the whole nature/culture divide might be collapsed.
So to answer your questions about the digital field and con-
trol, we need to know that Tarde regarded contagion as mostly 
accidental. Although it is the very thing that produces the so-
cial, to the extent that by even counter-imitating we are still very 
much products of imitation, Tarde doesn’t offer much hope in 
terms of how these contagions can be controlled or resisted. He 
does briefly mention the cultivation or nurturing of imitation, 
however, this is not very well developed. But Virality adds affect 
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theory to Tarde (and some claim that he is a kind of proto-affect 
theorist), which produces some different outcomes. When, for 
example, we add notions of affective atmospheres to his notion 
of the crowd, i.e. the role of moods, feelings and emotions, and 
the capacity to affectively prime and build up a momentum of 
mood, a new kind of power dynamic of contagion comes into 
view.
While we must not lose sight of Tarde’s accident, the idea 
that capricious affective contagion can be stirred or steered into 
action in some way so as to have a kind of an effect needs to be 
considered. Crudely, we can’t cause virality or switch it on, but 
we can agitate or provoke it into potential states of vectorial be-
coming. This is how small changes might become big; how that 
is, the production of a certain mood, for example, might eventu-
ally territorialize a network. Although any potential contagious 
overspill needs to be considered a refrain that could, at any mo-
ment, collapse back into a capricious line of flight.
The flipside of this affective turn, which has, on one hand, 
allowed us new critical insights into how things might potential-
ly spread on a network, is that digital marketers and political 
strategists are, on the other hand, looking very closely at moods 
through strategies of emotional branding and marketing felt ex-
periences. The entire “like” economy of corporate social media 
is, of course, designed emotionally. Facebook’s unethical emo-
tional contagion experiment in 2014 stands out as an example 
of how far these attempts to steer the accidents of contagion 
might go.
3) Five years after the release of Virality, The Assemblage Brain is pub-
lished in 2017. A year that has seen a new political paradigm: Trump 
has succeeded Obama in the United States, a country which we could 
define as the benchmark of the development of today’s western élites and 
as a metaphor of power. Both have used the social networks to spread their 
political message, political unconscious as you would say. As an expert 
of contagion, and political use of the social networks, what lesson can we 
learn from such experience?
In the UK we’re still arguing over what kind of dystopia we’re 
in: 1984, Brave New World? So it’s funny that someone described 
the book to me as a dystopian novel.
“Surely all these terrible things haven’t happened yet?”
“This is just a warning of where we might go wrong in the 
future.”
I’m not so sure about that. Yes, I make references to the dysto-
pian fictions that inspired Deleuze’s control society, but in many 
ways I think I underestimated just how bad things have got.
It’s a complex picture though, isn’t it? There are some famil-
iar narrative emerging. The mass populist move to the right has, 
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in part, been seen as a class based reaction against the old neolib-
eral elites and their low wage economy which has vastly enriched 
the few. We experienced the fallout here in the UK with Brexit 
too. Elements of the working class seemed to vociferously cheer 
for Farage. Perhaps Brexit was a catchier, emotionally branded 
virus. It certainly unleashed a kind of political unconsciousness, 
tapping into a nasty mixture of nationalism and racism under 
the seemingly empowering, yet ultimately oppressing slogan 
“We Want Our Country Back.” Indeed, the data shows that more 
Leave messages spread on social media than Remain.
But those quick to blame the stupidity of white working class 
somnambulists rallying against a neoliberal elite have surely got 
it wrong. Brexit made a broad and bogus emotional appeal to 
deluded nationalists from across the class divide who feared the 
country had lost its identity because of the free movement of peo-
ple. This acceleration towards the right was, of course, steered 
by the trickery of a sinister global coalition of corporate-political 
fascists – elites like Farage, Brexiteers like Johnson and Gove, 
and Trump’s knuckleheads in the US.
What can we learn about the role of digital media played in 
this trickery? We are already learning more about the role of 
filter bubbles that propagate these influences, and fake news, of 
course. We also need to look more closely at the claims surround-
ing the behavioural data techniques of Cambridge Analytica and 
the right wing networks that connect this sinister global coali-
tion to the US billionaire, Robert Mercer. Evidently, claims that 
the behavioural analysis of personal data captured from social 
media can lead to mass manipulation are perhaps overblown, 
but again, we could be looking at very small and targeted influ-
ences that leads to something big. Digital theorists also need to 
focus on the effectiveness of Trump supporting Twitter bots and 
the affects of Trump’s unedited, troll-like directness on Twitter.
But we can’t ignore the accidents of influence. Indeed, I’m 
now wondering if there’s a turn of events. Certainly, here in 
the UK, after the recent General Election, UKIP seem to be a 
spent political force, for now anyhow. The British Nationalist 
Party have collapsed. The Tories are now greatly weakened. So 
while we cannot ignore the rise of extreme far right hate crime, 
it seems now that although we were on the edge of despair, and 
many felt the pain was just too much to carrying on, all of a sud-
den, there’s some hope again. “We Want Our Country Back” has 
been replaced with a new hopeful earworm chant of “Oh Jeremy 
Corbyn!”
There are some comparisons here with Obama’s unanticipat-
ed election win. A good part of Obama love grew from some 
small emotive postings on social media. Similarly, Corbyn’s re-
cent political career has emerged from a series of almost acci-
dental events; from his election as party leader to this last elec-
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tion result. Public opinion about austerity, which seemed to be 
overwhelmingly and somnambulistically in favour of self-oppres-
sion, has, it seems, flipped. The shocking events of the Grenfell 
Tower fire seems to be having a similar impact on Tory austerity 
as Hurricane Katrina did on the unempathetic G.W. Bush.
It’s interesting that Corbyn’s campaign machine managed to 
ride the wave of social media opinion with some uplifting, posi-
tive messages about policy ideas compared to the fearmongering 
of the right. The Tories spent £1million on negative Facebook 
ads, while Labour focused on producing mostly positive, moti-
vating and sharable videos. Momentum are also working with 
developers, designers, UI/UX engineers on mobile apps that 
might help galvanize campaign support on the ground.
4. Let’s now turn to your book, The Assemblage Brain. The first ques-
tion is about neuroculture. It is in fact quite clear that you are not ap-
proaching it under a biological, psychological, economic or marketing 
point of view. What is your approach in outlining neuroculture and more 
specifically what do you define as neurocapitalism?
The idea for the book was mostly prompted by criticism of 
fleeting references to mirror neurons in Virality. Both Tarde and 
Deleuze invested heavily in the brain sciences in their day and I 
suppose I was following on with that cross-disciplinary trajecto-
ry. But this engagement with science is, of course, not without 
its problems. So I wanted to spend some time thinking through 
how my work could relate to science, as well as art. There were 
some contradictions to reconcile. On one hand, I had followed 
this Deleuzian neuro-trajectory, but on the other hand, the criti-
cal theorist in me struggled with the role science plays in the cul-
tural circuits of capitalism. I won’t go into too much detail here, 
but the book begins by looking at what seems to be a bit of the-
oretical backtracking by Deleuze and Guattari in their swansong 
What is Philosophy? In short, as Stengers argues, the philosophy of 
mixture in their earlier work is ostensibly replaced by the almost 
biblical announcement of “thou shalt not mix!” But it seems that 
the reappearance of disciplinary boundaries helps us to better 
understand how to overcome the different enunciations of phi-
losophy, science and art, and ultimately, via the method of the in-
terference, produce a kind of nonlocalised philosophy, science 
and art.
What is Philosophy? is also crucially about the brain’s encoun-
ter with chaos. It’s a counter- phenomenological, Whiteheadian 
account of the brain that questions the whole notion of matter 
and what arises from it. I think its subject matter also returns 
us to Bergson’s antilocationist stance in Matter and Memory. 
So in part, The Assemblage Brain is a neurophilosophy book. It 
explores the emotional brain thesis and the deeply ecological 
nature of noncognitive sense making. But the first part traces 
a neuropolitical trajectory of control that connects the neuro-
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sciences to capitalism, particularly apparent in the emotion turn 
we see in the management of digital labour and new marketing 
techniques, as well as the role of neuropharmaceuticals in con-
trolling attention.
So neurocapitalism perhaps begins with the G.W. Bush an-
nouncement that the 1990s were the Decade of the Brain. 
Thereafter, government and industry investment in neurosci-
ence research has exceeded genetics and is spun out to all kinds 
of commercial applications. It is now this expansive discursive 
formation that needs unpacking. But how to proceed? Should 
we analyse this discourse? Well, yes, but a problem with discourse 
analysis is that it too readily rubbishes science for making con-
crete facts from the hypothetical results of experimentation 
rather than trying to understand the implications of experimen-
tation. To challenge neurocapitalism I think we need to take seri-
ously both concrete and hypothetical experimentation. Instead 
of focusing too much on opening up a critical distance, we need 
to ask what is it that science is trying to make functional. For 
example, critical theory needs to directly engage with neuroe-
conomics and subsequent claims about the role neurochemicals 
might play in the relation between emotions and choice, addic-
tion and technology use, and attention and consumption. It also 
needs to question the extent to which the emotional turn in the 
neurosciences has been integrated into the cultural circuits of 
capitalism. It needs ask why neuroscientists, like Damasio, get 
paid to do keynotes at neuromarketing conferences!
5) A Spinozian question. After What can a virus do? in Virality you 
have moved to What can a brain do? in The Assemblage Brain. Can 
you describe your shift from the virus to the brain and especially what 
you want to reach in your research path of Spinozian enquiry What can 
a body do? What creative potential do you attribute to the brain? And in 
Virilio’s perspective how many “hidden incidents in the brain itself” may 
lie in questioning: What can be done to a brain? How dangerous can the 
neural essence be when applied to technological development? The front 
line seems to be today in the individual cerebral areas and in the process 
of subjectivity under ruling diagrams of neural types...
Yes, the second part of the book looks at the liberating poten-
tial of sense making ecologies. I don’t just mean brain plasticity 
here. I’m not so convinced with Malabou’s idea that we can free 
the brain by way knowing our brain’s plastic potential. It plays a 
part, but we risk simply transferring the sovereignty of the self 
to the sovereignty of the synaptic self. I’m less interested in the 
linguistically derived sense of self we find here, wherein the sym-
bolic is assumed to explain to us who we are (the self that says 
“I”). I’m more interested in Malabou’s warning that brain plas-
ticity risks being hijacked by neoliberal notions of individualised 
worker flexibility.
Protevi’s Spinoza-inspired piece on the Nazis Nuremburg Ral-
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lies becomes more important in the book. So there’s different 
kinds of sensory power that can either produce more passive 
somnambulist Nazis followers or encourage a collective capacity 
towards action that fights fascism. Both work on a population 
through affective registers, which are not necessarily positive or 
negative, but rather sensory stimulations that produce certain 
moods. So, Protevi usefully draws on Deleuze and Bruce Wex-
ler’s social neuroscience to argue that subjectivity is always being 
made (becoming) in deeply relational ways. Through our rela-
tion to carers, for instance, we see how subjectivity is a multiple 
production, never a given – more a perpetual proto-subjectivity 
in the making. Indeed, care is, in itself, deeply sensory and rela-
tional. The problem is that the education of our senses is increas-
ingly experienced in systems of carelessness; from Nuremburg to 
the Age of Austerity. This isn’t all about fear. The Nazis focus on 
joy and pleasure (Freude), for example, worked on the mood of 
a population enabling enough racist feelings and a sense of su-
periority to prepare for war and the Holocaust. Capitalism sim-
ilarly acts to pacify consumers and workers; to keep “everybody 
happy now” in spite of the degrees of nonconscious compulsion, 
obsolescence and waste, and disregard for environmental de-
struction. Yet, at the extreme, in the Nazis death camps, those 
with empathy were most likely to die. Feelings were completely 
shut down. In all these cases though, we find these anti-care sys-
tems in which the collective capacity to power is closed down.
Nonetheless, brains are deeply ecological. In moments of ex-
treme sensory deprivation they will start to imagine images and 
sounds. The socially isolated brain will imagine others. In this 
context, it’s interesting that Wexler returns us to the importance 
of imitative relations. Again, we find here an imitative relation 
that overrides the linguistic sense of an inner self (a relation of 
interiority) and points instead to sense making in relation to ex-
teriority. Without having to resort to mirror neurons, I feel there 
is a strong argument here for imitation as a powerful kind of 
affective relation that can function on both sides of Spinoza’s 
affective registers.
6) Let’s talk about specialized Control and neurofeedback: the neu-
rosubject seen as the slave of the future of the sedated behaviour. Is it 
possible to train or to correct a brain? Let’s go back to the relation between 
politics and neuroculture. Trump’s administration displays neuropolitics 
today: for example “Neurocore” is a company where Betsy DeVos (current 
Trump’s US Secretary of Education) is the main shareholder. It is a com-
pany specialised in neuro-feedback techniques where one can learn how to 
modulate and therefore to control internal or external cerebral functions 
like some human-computer interfaces do. Neurocore affirms that they are 
able to positively work the electric impulses of the cerebral waves. What 
can we expect from mental wellness researches through neurofeedback and 
from self-regulated or digitally self-empowered cerebral manipulations, in 
politics and in society?
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Of course, claims made by these brain training companies are 
mostly about gimmicky, money spinning, neuro-speculation. But 
I think this focus on ADHD is interesting. It also addresses the 
point you made in the previous question about being neurotypi-
cal. So Neurocore, like other similar businesses, claim to be able 
to treat the various symptoms of attention deficit by applying 
neuroscience. This usually means diagnosis via EEG – looking 
at brainwaves associated with attention/inattention – and then 
some application of noninvasive neurofeedback rather than 
drug interventions. OK, so by stimulating certain brainwaves it 
is perhaps possible to produce a degree of behavioural change 
akin to Pavlov or Skinner. But aside from these specific claims, 
there’s more a general and political relation established between 
the sensory environments of capitalism and certain brain-somat-
ic states. I think these relations are crucial to understanding the 
paradoxical and dystopic nature of neurocapitalism.
For example, ADHD is assumed by many to be linked to faulty 
dopamine receptors and detected by certain brainwaves (there’s 
a FDA certified EEG diagnosis in the US), but the condition it-
self is a paradoxical mix of attention and inattention. On one 
hand, people with ADHD are distracted from the things they are 
supposed to neurotypically pay attention to, like school, work, 
paying the bills etc., and on the other, they are supposed to be 
hyper- attentive to the things that are regarded as distractions, 
like computer games, and other obsessions that they apparently 
spend disproportionate time on. There is a clear attempt here 
to manage certain kinds of attention through differing modes of 
sensory stimulation. But what’s neurotypical for school seems to 
clash with what’s neurotypical in the shopping mall. Inattention, 
distractibility, disorganization, impulsiveness and restlessness 
seem to be prerequisite behaviours for hyper-consumption.
Not surprisingly then, ADHD, OCD and dementia become 
part of the neuromarketer’s tool bag; that is, the consumer is 
modelled by a range of brain pathologies e.g. the attention- chal-
lenged, forgetful consumer whose compulsive drives are essen-
tial to brand obsessions. All this links to the control society thesis 
and Deleuze’s location of marketing as the new enemy and the 
potential infiltration of neurochemicals and brainwaves as the 
latest frontier in control.
What I do in the book is look back at the origins of the con-
trol society thesis, found explicitly in the dystopias of Burroughs 
and implicitly in Huxley. What we find is a familiar paradoxical 
switching between freedom and slavery, joyful coercion and op-
pression. In short, the most effective dystopias are always dressed 
up as utopias.
7) What then is an assemblage brain? It seems to me that a precise 
thought line passing from Bergson, Tarde, Deleuze, Guattari, Whitehe-
ad, Ruyer and Simondon has been traced here. You write: Everything is 
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potentially «becoming brain». Why? And which difference is there with 
the cybernetic model of brain, prevailing today?
Although I don’t really do much Whitehead in the book, I 
think his demand for a nonbifurcated theory of nature is the 
starting point for the assemblage brain. Certainly, by the time I 
get to discuss Deleuze’s The Fold, Whitehead is there in all but 
name. So there’s this beautiful quote that I’ve used in a more 
recent article that perfectly captures what I mean...
[W]e cannot determine with what molecules the brain begins and the 
rest of the body ends. Further, we cannot tell with what molecules the 
body ends and the external world begins. The truth is that the brain is 
continuous with the body, and the body is continuous with the rest of the 
natural world. Human experience is an act of self-origination including 
the whole of nature, limited to the perspective of a focal region, located 
within the body, but not necessarily persisting in any fixed coordination 
with a definite part of the brain. (2)
This captures the antilocationist stance of the book, which 
rallies against a series of locationist positions in neuroculture 
ranging from what has been described as fMRI- phrenology to 
the neurophilosophy of Metzinger’s Platonic Ego Tunnel. The 
cybernetic model of sense making is a locationist model of sense 
making writ large. The cognitive brain is this computer that 
stores representations somewhere in a mental model that seems 
to hover above matter. It communicates with the outside world 
through internal encoding/decoding information processors, 
and even when this information becomes widely distributed 
through external networks, the brain model doesn’t change, but 
instead we encounter the same internal properties in this ridic-
ulous notion of a megabrain or collective intelligence. We find 
a great antidote to the megabrain in Tarde’s social monadology, 
but The Fold brilliantly upsets the whole notion that the outside 
is nothing more than an image stored on the inside. On the 
contrary, the inside is nothing more than a fold on the outside.
To further counter such locationist perspectives on sense 
making – Whitehead’s limitations of the focal region - we need 
to rethink the question of matter and what arises from it. For ex-
ample, Deleuze’s use of Ruyer results in this idea that everything 
is potentially becoming brain. There are, as such, micro-brains 
everywhere in Whitehead’s nonbifurcated assemblage – the so-
ciety of molecules that compose the stone, e.g. which senses the 
warmth of the sun.
There’s evidently politics in here too. The ADHD example I 
mentioned is a locationist strategy that says our response to the 
stresses and disruptions experienced in the world today can be 
traced back to a problem that starts inside the head. On the con-
trary, it’s in our relations with these systems of carelessness that 
we will find the problem!
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8) You declare that the couple “mind/brain” is insolvable. Against the 
ratio of the scientific concept of the «mind» you counterpose the chaotic 
materiality of the «brain» writing that the brain is the chaos which con-
tinues to haunt science (p.195). Can we say that such irreducible escape 
from chaos expressed in your metaphor of Huxley’s escape from Plato’s 
cavern, shows your preference for What is Philosophy by Deleuze and 
Guattari rather than A Thousand Plateaus where the assemblage theory 
is displayed?
So yes, in The Fold there is no mind/brain distinction, just, as 
What is Philosophy continues with, this encounter between mat-
ter and chaos. The brain simply returns or is an exchange point 
for the expression of chaos – Whitehead’s narrow “focal point” 
of the percipient event. This is, as Stengers argues, nothing more 
than a mere foothold of perception, not a command post! Such 
a concept of nature evidently haunts the cognitive neuroscienc-
es approach that seeks, through neuroaesthetics, for example, 
to locate the concept of beauty in the brain. We might be able 
to trace a particular sensation to a location in the brain, by, for 
example, tweaking a rat’s whisker so that it corresponds with a 
location in the brain, but the neurocorrelates between these sen-
sations and the concept of beauty are drastically misunderstood 
as a journey from matter to mental stuff or matter to memory.
I think the metaphor of Huxley’s acid fuelled escape from 
Plato’s cave, which is contrasted with Dequincy’s opiated journey 
to the prison of the self, helps, in a slightly tongue-in-cheek way, 
to explore the difference between relations of interiority and ex-
teriority or tunnels and folds. The point is to contrast Dequincy’s 
need to escape the harsh world he experienced in the early in-
dustrial age by hiding inside his opiated dream world with Hux-
ley’s acid induced experience of “isness.” Huxley was certainly 
reading Bergson when he wrote Doors of Perception, so I think 
he was looking to route round the kind of perception explained 
by the journey from matter to the mental. My attempt at a some-
what crude lyrical conclusion is that while Dequincy hides in his 
tunnel Huxley is out there in the nonbifurcated fold...
9) One last question (maybe more ethical than what we would expect 
from new media theorists today) involves the aspect of a meeting between 
a virus and a brain. Which ethical, biological, political, social and phil-
osophical effects may occur when viruses are purposely introduced/inocu-
lated into human brain, as with «organoid» derived from grown cells in 
research laboratories? Growing a brain from embryonic cells and wildly 
experimenting modifying its growth can take the zoon politikon to a critical 
edge? Neither machines, or men or cyborg, but simple wearable synthetic 
micro- masses. Are we approaching in huge strides the bio-inorganic era 
that Deleuze defined in his book on Foucault, as the era of man in charge 
of the very rocks, or inorganic matter (the domain of silicon)?
One way to approach this fascinating question might be to 
again compare Metzinger’s neuroethics with an ethics of The Fold. 
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On one hand, there’s this human right to use neurotechnologies 
and pharmaceutical psychostimulants to tinker with the Ego Tun-
nel. It’s these kind of out of body experiences that Metzinger’s 
claims will free us from the virtual sense of self by enabling hu-
mans to look back at ourselves and see through the illusion of the 
cave brain. On the other hand, the ethics of The Fold suggests a 
more politically flattened and nonbifurcated ecological relation 
between organic and inorganic matter. The nightmare of the 
wearable micro-masses ideal you mention would, I suppose, sit 
more concretely in the former. Infected with this virus, we would 
not just look back at ourselves, but perhaps spread the politics of 
the Anthropocene even further into the inorganic world. In many 
ways, looking at the capitalist ruins in which we live in now, we 
perhaps already have this virus in our heads? Indeed, isn’t human-
ity a kind of virus in itself? Certainly, our lack of empathy for the 
planet we contaminate is staggering. I would tend to be far more 
optimistic about being in the fold since even though we still have 
our animal politics and Anthropocene to contend with, if we are 
positioned more closely in nature; that is, in the consequential de-
cay of contaminated matter, we may, at last, share in the feeling of 
decay. I suppose this is again already the case. We are living in the 
early ruins of inorganic and organic matter right now, yet we seem 
to think we can rise above it. But even Ego Tunnels like Trump will 
eventually find themselves rotting in the ruins.
Notes
1) Tony D Sampson and Jussi Parikka, “Learning from Network 
Dysfunctionality: Accidents, Enterprise and Small Worlds of Infec-
tion” in The Blackwell Companion to New Media Dynamics, Hart-
ley, Burgess and Bruns (eds.), Wiley-Blackwell, 2012.
2) Whitehead cited in Dewey, J “The Philosophy of Whitehead” in 
Schilpp, P.A (ed.) The Philosophy 2 of Alfred North Whitehead. Tutor 
Publishing Company, New York, 1951.
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Contagion Theory  
Beyond the Microbe
By Tony D. Sampson
@ CTheory (2011)
INTRODUCTION: FOUR INTERVENTIONS
Log on to the internet or visit a militant Islamic bookshop 
and within a few minutes you will find enough inspiration in 
CDs, ranting sermons, DVDs, for a hundred suicide bombs. It 
swirls across the Islamic world as an expression of rage against 
the West for the invasion of Iraq, support for Israel, and for West-
ern dominance of the world economy… It is only when the vast 
majority of law-abiding Muslim societies reject the cultural virus 
of suicide bombing and cease to glorify it that this plague will 
burn itself out. [1]
In this so-called age of networks, human communication is, 
it seems, increasingly redefined as a media virus. In the mili-
tary rhetoric of former CIA operative, Robert Baer (above), it 
is indeed difficult to tell apart the medium from the virus. The 
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greatest information network of all, the internet, has become, as 
Baer tells us, part of a “deadly virus” that spreads radicalization 
far and wide by way of a somewhat mysterious, “inspirational” 
connection with the societies it infects. Even old ways of doing 
communication are becoming part and parcel of this swirling 
viral media ecology. The fearsome biological analogies and med-
ical metaphors Baer, and other propagators of the War on Terror, 
readily exploit are nonetheless part of a far wider and potentially 
divisive epidemiological social paradigm. In computer network 
security, for example, there is a comparable (and interwoven) 
War on Viruses which has transformed the internet into an immu-
nological network infrastructure that defines to a great extent 
what you can and can’t do online. [2]
Significantly though, not all media viruses are dependent on 
fear and anxiety. In marketing circles, specifically those dedi-
cated to digital networks, virals and memes are the buzzwords 
of choice. The success of YouTube videos and social gaming on 
Facebook are, for example, measured in terms of a virality based 
on joyful encounters, sometimes verging on obsessive and com-
pulsive engagement. Indeed, network scientists and marketers 
claim to have learnt lessons from observing biological and dig-
ital viruses: lessons that some claim exceed mere analogical or 
metaphorical relations and point toward new universal models 
of contagious social influence and infectable consumer mood. 
[3] Evidently, the problem for communication theory is how to 
approach the many dimensions of the universal media virus. In-
tuitive as it may seem, its virality lacks substance. It is like a noise 
that contaminates the binary opposites of the established com-
munication model without prejudice. In the age of networks, 
senders and receivers and information and meaning are all sus-
ceptible to contagion.
Recently however, in network theory, the notion of microbial 
contagion has offered a refreshing alternative to established com-
munication theory insofar as the non-human microbe is reck-
oned to be synonymous with the network humans connect to. 
To be sure, it is the microbe that links up the individual nodes of 
the network transforming them into a collective social body. [4] 
Yet, problematically the microbe may not go far enough in terms 
of grasping the virality of communication. It certainly shares a 
lot in common with Baer’s deadly virus in as much as it relies on 
an indistinct and divisive biological analogy to explain how non-
human virality connects to an intensely human social medium.
This essay presents four interventions intended to redirect 
theoretical attention away from the medical discourses that 
underpin microbial contagion theory. [5] Although ostensibly 
discrete, each intervention is intended to probe the analogical 
artifice between the human and nonhuman by way of a Tardean 
monadological understanding of “social form” composed of 
emotional vectors and affective contagious encounters. The first 
intervention concerns what it is that spreads through infectable 
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social media. Here both Gabriel Tarde’s refusal to analytically 
separate psychological and biological realms from the wider so-
cial-physical world (of which they are both a part), and a more 
recent neurological understanding of the political unconscious, 
come together to foreground the importance of shared feelings 
in determining social influence. Yet, although feeling fear seems 
to be endemic to recent politically motivated contaminations 
of a population, there are other much-overlooked affects, like 
love, which are equally catching. Secondly, the essay confronts 
the deterministic thinking which seems to underline decidedly 
mechanistic interpretations of what spreads. This is equally evi-
dent in the analogical focus on microbes and memes as it is in 
a tendency in network theory to award agency to an emergent 
collective social consciousness.
The third intervention questions the validity of the network 
as an appropriate epidemiological diagram when evidently its 
standardization of space through nodes and edges tends to 
freeze out the temporality of epidemic events and accidents. 
This is, I contend, a “diagrammatic” problem at the center of 
contagion theory which can be interestingly re-approached via 
Tarde’s insights into economic crisis and celebrity culture. Lastly 
then, the essay focuses on a distinctive Tardean trajectory evi-
dent in contemporary capitalist business enterprise which looks 
set to exploit consumer mood and guide intention by targeting 
the mostly unconscious neurological absorption of human and 
non-human affective contagions.
These four interventions draw upon a resuscitation of crowd 
contagion theories dating back to the late nineteenth century. 
Such a revival is not without its problems, not least because of 
the negative notions it attaches to social collectivity, conform-
ity, obedience and vulnerability. However, unlike the extreme 
conservatism of his contemporary, Gustave Le Bon, in a series 
of publications, Tarde forwarded an epidemiological diagram 
which arguably provides a much clearer understanding of social 
relation outside of the reductive limitations of organic social cat-
egory, and at the same time probes between the artifice that di-
vides biological and psychological phenomena from social the-
ory. [6] In these texts Tarde sets out an approach that would go 
on to greatly influence Gilles Deleuze and Bruno Latour (among 
others). But as I aim to show in my work, he is much more than a 
mere footnote to assemblage and actor network theory.
1. WHAT SPREADS?
Feeling Fear
Although positioning microbial contagion as a distinctly 
non-human affair, Eugene Thacker suggests an intriguing and 
perhaps purposefully indistinct human relation to it insofar as 
he draws our attention to how “we humans” feel about becoming 
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infected. [6] The most apparent of these feelings is triggered by 
our contagious encounter with the microbe, which tends to “elic-
it” the negative emotions of “fear” and “anxiety”. [8] As Thacker 
seems to infer, contagion is generally grasped within a medical 
discursive frame as a horrendous conflict between human and 
nonhuman agencies.
Contagion and infection are more than mechanisms of an-
tigen recognition and antibody response; they are, as our text-
books tell us, entire ‘wars’ and ‘invasions’ continuously fought 
on the battle lines of the human body. [9]
These are, it would appear, fears and anxieties induced by 
a sense of invasiveness of what spreads beyond the battle lines 
into non-biological contexts. Reminiscent perhaps of Michel 
Foucault’s earlier observations on how the space of plagues and 
epidemics (like leprosy) opened up new disciplinary territories 
that would further exclude the nonhuman from the human 
world,[10] this current exercise of biopower seems to carry for-
ward discursive epidemiological power into new and as yet un-
charted corners of social cartography. To be sure, the emotion-
al responses to these unwelcome incursions by the microbe are 
increasingly exploited by the defenders of network sovereignty 
— particularly in the rhetorical terms used to describe the threat 
posed by the cultural and biological viruses of the terrorist cell.
There is, as Thacker argues elsewhere, an Agambenian “zone 
of indistinction”, or biopolitical continuum, at play in the rhet-
oric of the War on Terror, which exceptionally merges the lan-
guage used to describe the terrorist with that used to describe 
the microbial virus. [11] But there is perhaps nothing new in 
such myth making. It is certainly a central plank of a much old-
er ideological critique that recognizes how culture is often stra-
tegically turned into nature. [12]Nonetheless, are these trans-
missions of fear and anxiety adequately explained by a semiotic 
model of communication, based as it is on the spreading of false 
beliefs conjured up by images, words and ideas? How does this 
old approach, which in effect divides up culture and nature, ac-
count for an inherent social vulnerability to suggestion beyond 
resorting to a fuzzy state of false consciousness? It would seem 
that the emotional openness to repetitive and ever converging 
transmissions of statements of this kind exceed mere ideological 
productions of myth. Indeed, would not belief (and how it can 
spread) need to be reconsidered, ahead of ideas, as the bringing 
on of mostly insensible and unconscious responses intended to 
trigger deep seated fears, anxieties, panic, and insecurity? Is this 
not a neurological contamination that exposes the mind to an 
entire valence (fearsome and joyful) of affective encounters that 
herald the idea?
So as to further deliberate on the affective and contagious 
qualities of what spreads I want to briefly introduce three think-
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ers who help to frame an alternative to ideological models of 
transmission. The first, George Lakoff, (a cognitive scientist) 
focuses attention on a neurological understanding of how the 
political mind can be tapped into and activated. The second, Te-
resa Brennan, presents a theory of affective transmission that re-
thinks the relation between culture and nature by removing the 
pretence of the divide that separates them, and focuses instead 
on an intersection point wherein what is socially encountered, 
and biologically responded to, meet. Finally, I turn to Tarde’s 
late nineteenth-century social contagion theory which similar-
ly locates the human condition somewhere in between deliber-
ate volition, biologically motivated mechanical habits and the 
self-spreading of desires and social invention. Importantly, all 
three are advocates of a concept of social subjectivity that is not 
closed or self-contained, but is instead open to contagious sug-
gestibility of others.
A Neurological Unconscious
To begin with, I want to acknowledge George Lakoff’s neu-
rological understanding of a mostly unconscious political mind. 
Lakoff describes a mind made vulnerable to outside political 
manipulation through appeals to emotional markers, which can 
trigger feelings (including those related to infection) already 
contained in neurological bindings, or what he calls the meta-
phorical frames of the mind. [13] Following the prominent work 
of neuroscientist Antonio Damasio in the mid 1990s, as well as 
“accepting” the fairly recent mirror (or empathy) neuron hy-
pothesis, [14] Lakoff points to the absorbency of somatic markers, 
which can be persistently activated so as to provoke the “right” 
feelings and emotions, almost to order. [15] So, for example, 
following 9/11, the much repeated video images of The Twin 
Towers falling played alongside rhythmic utterances of “Islam” 
and “extremism” evokes fear in the neural circuits of a mind that 
empathizes (shares in the feeling) with what it encounters via its 
sensory system. [16]
To fully grasp how the neurological unconscious might work, 
we need to firstly register Damasio’s contra-Kantian (and Car-
tesian) argument that our reasoning and decision-making pro-
cesses are not as purely cognitive as we may think they are. In 
fact, Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis persuasively argues 
that “emotions and feelings may not be intruders in the bastion 
of reason at all; they may be enmeshed in its networks.” [17] 
Secondly, according to neuroscience, our understanding of how 
feelings get passed on need no longer to be informed by an un-
knowable empathic transmission. The location of so-called mir-
ror neurons supposedly points to the brain processes behind the 
sharing of feelings and mood. Mirror neurons are said to be the 
equivalent of human-to-human “wireless communication,” and 
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have been linked to innate imitative human relations occurring 
between infants and adults. [18]
It is the porous volatility of the political mind to the feelings 
and suggestions of others (up close and mediated over distance) 
that leads to an important question for contagion theory: is it 
not what “we feel” about what spreads that becomes the most effectual 
contagion of all? If this is indeed the case, then the contagious 
encounter is not exclusively explained by the unique merging 
of linguistic terms strategically relating human to invasive non-
human worlds, but instead reveals a multisensory intersection 
point in-between what have traditionally been regarded by much 
of academia as separate social and biological domains. Argua-
bly, unlike the horrors of the microbial metaphor, this force of 
contagious encounter is not at all biologically determined. The 
spreading of fear is instead an intermingling of affective social 
phenomena and hardwired biological responses that activate 
and adapt each other.
At very least this appeal to cognitive neuroscience may help 
to provide a more graspable process by which infectable humans 
encounter the “living” horrors of the microbial world. Commu-
nication theory should, in any case, pay close attention to a simi-
lar neurological concentration apparent in political psychology, 
marketing, and product design where the affective priming of 
experience is fast becoming endemic to the study of social influ-
ence and methods of persuasion. [19] Accordingly, what spreads 
is understood to pass unconsciously through the skin into the 
viscerality of human experience, guiding automatic behavior, 
before it moves upstream to the conscious reflective mind and 
sense of volition. The strategic convergence of the epidemic and 
suicide bomber can still be grasped as Thacker puts it, in the “in-
novative ways” human beings have developed by which to “live 
through microbes”. [20] Here, however, we have a process no 
less that begins for the most part by a contaminating encounter 
with an event. It is the manifestation of affects in this encounter 
which move upstream, activating mostly unconscious feelings of 
horror, before they intersect with the downstream flows of a neu-
ral circuitry loaded with manipulable and biographical emotion-
al content.
It is this seemingly ready-made, yet highly absorbent and ad-
aptable circuitry that is, Lakoff claims, tapped into by political 
strategists, so that, for example, the repetition of the images and 
the utterances of the War on Terror reinforce and activate neg-
ative conservative neurological bindings rather than acting to 
challenge and change the way people think. [21] Significantly, 
for Lakoff, the idea that the political mind is openly vulnerable 
to suggestion in this way (and potentially prone to passing on 
such suggestions via neuronal transfers) confronts the unyield-
ing artifice erected and maintained by the same Enlightenment 
aficionados Damasio identifies: that is, an abrupt separation be-
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tween somatic experiences and the evolutionary hardwiring of a 
self-contained and rational mind. But as the subtitle of Lakoff’s 
political mind thesis argues, “you can’t understand 21st-Century 
American politics with an 18th-Century brain.” It would seem 
that the Enlightenment artifice between contaminating emotion 
and pure reason disintegrates at the point where what is socially 
suggested, and biologically responded to, intersects: an encounter 
between upstream flows of affect and downstream biological responses.
The Transmission of Affective Contagion
In her analysis of the decline of nineteenth century crowd 
theory, Teresa Brennan notes the ominous implications of what 
replaced it. The cognitive turn in the twentieth century not only 
re-concentrated enquiry on the rational minds of a self-con-
tained individual, but also bisected biological and sociological 
explanations of collective social interaction. [22] The theory of 
the self-contained individual stresses, as such, that it is an evo-
lutionary hardwired and conscious cognition that determines 
human agency rather than natural phenomena, like emotions, 
feelings and affect. For Brennan however, what spreads (affect) 
turns such a crude dichotomy on its head by significantly plac-
ing social encounter ahead of biological adaptation. Despite 
the prevalent “prejudice concerning the biological and the so-
cial” and the “belief in [a subject’s] self-containment” that ob-
sessed early social scientists’ interest in how collectives respond 
to each other, Brennan argues that the biological and the social 
are irrevocably blended together. [23] Contagion is, like this, “a 
simple affective transfer” discerned by permeable individuals in 
rooms and other affective atmospheres of encounter. [24] She 
compares it to entrainment whereby a person’s affects can con-
taminate another, pulling or pushing them along in rhythmic 
synchronization. Importantly, affective transmission does not 
originate in the biologically hardwired drives of the individual. 
To be sure, the porous self is nothing like the inward looking 
ego (only thinking of itself). [25]On the contrary, the affective 
transfer is always, from the outset, social. But this encounter is 
not social in the sense of the term accepted in mainstream soci-
ological categorizations. The encounter comes from out there 
in the affective atmosphere, and can as such, spread from per-
son-to-person, entering into the skin and hacking into the evolu-
tionary drives.
Viral Love
Importantly then, the biopolitical intensity of what spreads 
through affective atmospheres should not be limited to negative 
transmissions of fear. There is a need to consider a far wider 
valence of virality contaminating the social mood. [26] Love, or 
viral love as I call it, might even be regarded as more contagious 
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than fear. As Brennan contends, love as an affect is very differ-
ent to negative affects which require an independent medium 
of transmission. Love, in contrast, is both affect and the medium 
through which the affect travels. [27] Viral love is in this sense 
both virus and viral environment enfolded into one communi-
cable space.
Whether or not viral love is in fact a more powerful contam-
inator than fear is not really the focus here, but as a concept 
it usefully brings together the notions of neurological uncon-
sciousness and affective contagion with the seminal contagion 
theory set out by Tarde in the late 1800s. As Tarde claimed, the 
most ingenious and potent of political strategies appeals not to 
fear alone, but also the desire to love and be loved in return, 
and the potential to contagiously pass on those loving feelings to 
others to imitate. According to Tarde, it is the “power of belief 
and desire…” of the “love and faith” of the social somnambulist 
(a neurologically unconscious social subject by any other name) 
that produces “obedience and imitation.” [28] In other words, 
the somnambulist succumbs to emotional appeals to his sense 
of fascination, attraction, allure and absorption, and a tenden-
cy to become distracted by the animations of his environment. 
Viral love may well be compared, as such, to a contagious social 
neurosis, or mass attention deficit disorder, but it is not feared 
like a microbial disease. Despite being mostly unconscious of 
its affects, the somnambulist is not controlled or panicked into 
submission by epidemics of fear, but willingly engages with the 
faith and hope inspired by his joyful and mesmeric encounter 
with love. [29] Social obedience is partially guided then by “un-
heard-of expenditures of love and of unsatisfied love at that.” 
[30] Significantly, these investments in love made by religious 
and political institutions of power, Tarde claims, satisfy a “persis-
tent need of loving and admiring,” requiring the raising up of 
“new idols… from time to time.” [31]
So who are the new idols of viral love on the contemporary 
political scene? Well, in contrast to the microbial contagions 
of the GW Bush administration and its appeal to the political 
unconscious through the cold emotionless channels of advisors 
like Cheney and the fear mongering of Rumsfeld, Lakoff notes 
how Obama’s campaign of hope and change managed to em-
pathically tap into the infectable emotions of many US voters. 
This was certainly a contagion befitting the age of networks. 
From the outset, Obama’s election campaign team made the 
best possible use of the intimate features of Web 2.0 applications 
to spread activism through joyful encounters experienced pre-
dominantly at-a-distance. On Facebook you can become Obama’s 
friend (one of nearly 9.5 million to date). You can find out that 
he enjoys “basketball, writing, spending time w/ kids” and what 
his favorite music, books and TV shows are. Yet, it is the Obama 
team’s pre-election use of Flickr that best illustrates the empath-
ic virality of political love. [32] For it signalled the new presi-
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dent’s intention to sidestep the formality and distance of Cheney 
and Rumsfeld, and instead intercept, through these networks, 
the affective flows of those voters disillusioned by GW Bush. Of 
course, Obama is a powerful orator, using rhetorical skills as old 
as Aristotle, and that should never be underestimated, but the 
emotionally charged and intimate pictures of his family on the 
eve of his election spread through global media networks like a 
firestorm, painting a mood and stirring up a worldwide love con-
tagion. What is important to stress here is not necessarily a du-
alistic relation between fear and love, but a political element of 
communication that exceeds the semiotic realm of effect. These 
are haptic images that quite literally touch the eye. As one Flickr 
user’s comments perfectly capture the empathic transmission 
flowing from these images: “I love this shot. You can feel the but-
terflies in their stomachs as they are watching the returns.” [33]
The events leading to the election of the first black US Presi-
dent were certainly marked by a global outpouring of love. In this 
sense, Obama’s love contagion seemed to attune itself to a posi-
tive flow of the love of difference. As Tony Negri suggested short-
ly after Obama’s election, behind this great victory may well be 
traces of the great struggle of the multitude, certainly in terms of 
its positive role in the globalization of the issue of race. [34] Yet, 
viral love can be capricious too. Whether or not Obama can truly 
live up to the expectations of the multitude project, and deliver 
the spontaneous democracy it desires, is of course highly ques-
tionable. Perhaps the short lived virality of this example of a love 
of difference has already been subsumed into what Michael Hardt 
has identified as the dictatorial counter forces of a love of the same. 
[35] Certainly, as I write, Obama’s contagion is already oscillating 
uncontrollably between unrequited love and a love gone bad.
To conclude this section, what spreads might be considered 
using a term Nigel Thrift adapts from both Brennan’s theory of 
affect and Tarde’s original thesis. Affective contagion re-stresses 
the ‘involuntary precognitive nature’ of what is passed-on. [36] 
What spreads enters into the porous neural network of outlier 
relations that connect the self to the other (and other things) 
via the communicable media of the skin, as well as the intima-
cy of social networks. Again, this is not an exclusively biological 
or social contagion, as traditionally understood. What spreads, 
as both Brennan and Thrift point out, is what passes through an 
intersection point or artifice. [37] Significantly, what spreads is 
passed on, not just through fear and anxiety, but via passions, ob-
sessions, and other empathic transfers that are equally catching. 
What spreads certainly has the capacity to capriciously affect (and 
become affected) across the valence of positive and negative feel-
ings. What spreads can be, in other words, a fearful or joyful mes-
meric encounter between indistinct social and biological worlds. 
It is an encounter that triggers empathic contagions that spread 
through adaptive atmospheres of affect and imitative entrain-
ment. As Brennan elegantly puts it, “[m]y affect, if it comes across 
to you, alters your anatomical makeup for good or ill.” [38]
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2. THE MECHANISM INDEPENDENCE OF CONTAGIOUS 
SOCIAL ENCOUNTER
The idea that social encounter is interwoven with biological adap-
tation is of course controversial. Before venturing further into Tarde’s 
contagion theory it is therefore necessary to grasp the importance of the 
intersection point he sets up between social and biological contexts and 
clearly distinguish it from deterministic thinking.
Using Tarde to Avoid Biological and Social Determinism
While it is noteworthy that Thacker has cautiously approached 
how the abstraction of contagion is transformed into non-bio-
logical contexts, such as the meme, viral marketing and comput-
er viruses, [39] microbial contagion is still at risk of falling into 
a similar deterministic trap. Indeed, it is perhaps too often the 
case that social and cultural contagion theorists look to biologi-
cal and medical discourses for their sole inspiration. The prob-
lem being that the analogies and metaphors made between the 
virality of genetic code inheritance, cultural imitation and digi-
tal replication inform a markedly biologically determined mech-
anism of infection. Like this, memetics is exemplary. It plays fast 
and loose with a universal biological referent and attempts by its 
advocates to claim Tarde as a forefather of the meme are deeply 
misleading. [40] To be sure, a Tardean “epidemiological” dia-
gram can be clearly differentiated from the deterministic logic 
of the neo-Darwinian meme/gene analogy, and its claim to be 
the definitive biological force shaping social and cultural fields. 
[41]
Since being fleetingly introduced in the closing chapter of 
Richard Dawkins’ bestseller The Selfish Gene in 1976, the geno-
centric evolutionism of the meme/gene analogy has gone on to 
be a highly influential, albeit controversial explanation of how 
culture spreads through a population. Accordingly, the meme 
virus is a unit of imitation which determines the evolutionary in-
variance and survival of the ideas that spread through a popula-
tion of minds. It follows that a population of minds will passively 
absorb the evolutionary mutations directed by the meme in or-
der to both survive and provide a better medium of propagation 
for the future survival of evolved memes. It is, at its extreme, 
part of a claim that everything from the mind to communica-
tion technologies like the internet are the outcome of memetic 
units constructing a more efficient communicable environment 
in which to self-spread.[42]
This is not to say that memetics does not begin with an inter-
esting premise. Like Tarde, to some extent, it points to the often 
unconscious transmission of what spreads through infectable 
populations. Nonetheless, what is considered to spread becomes 
a wholly mechanistic and self-contained evolutionary unit of imi-
tation. [43] As Brennan convincingly argues below, the neo-Dar-
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winist adopts an essentialist position that neglects to engage at 
all with the capacity of affects to occur outside of the genetically 
formed individual.
[According to neo-Darwinism] [t]he individual organism is 
born with the urges and affects that will determine its fate. Its 
predisposition to certain behaviors is part of its individual genet-
ic package, and, of course, these behaviors are intrinsically affec-
tive. Such behaviors and affects may be modified by the environ-
ment, or they may not survive because they are not adaptive. But 
the point is that no other source or origin for the affects is ac-
knowledged outside of the individual one. The dominant model 
for transmission in neo-Darwinism is genetic transmission. [44]
To be sure, in both biological and non-biological contexts, 
the neo-Darwinian paradigm negates the creative potential of 
chance encounters by grossly inflating the status of a determinis-
tic code mechanism. By analogy it attributes the same high level 
of agency to the fidelity, fecundity and longevity of the genetic 
package as it does to the passive passing on of a competing idea. 
Memetics crudely consigns, as such, the by and large capricious, 
unconscious and imitative transmission of desire and social in-
vention through a population to an insentient surrender to a 
self-serving code. [45] As Brennan continues, “the critical thing 
about it here is that its proponents ignore the claims of social 
and historical context when it comes to accounting for causa-
tion.” [46]
While Tarde’s epidemiological diagram and the biological 
determinism of memetics are demonstrably incompatible, it 
is equally important to distance him from social determinism. 
What composes the historical forces of the social is all too of-
ten accepted as a given. So, before thinking through the social 
context of contagion theory, it is useful to stress the discernible 
differences between Tarde and the intrinsic determinism of the 
Durkheimian social paradigm apparent in notions of social epi-
demiology. [47]What concretely distinguishes Tarde from Dur-
kheim is the latter’s attempt to render all things psychological, 
biological, and neurological categorically distinct from the so-
cial, while the former marks their inseparability. For example, 
in their “momentous debate” at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes 
Sociales in 1903, Durkheim reportedly made a particular issue 
of how the social sciences needed to make its subject matter sep-
arate from these other phenomena. As he puts it elsewhere:
[T]here is between psychology and sociology the same break 
in continuity as there is between biology and the physical and 
chemical sciences. Consequently, every time a social phenom-
enon is directly explained by a psychological phenomenon, we 
may rest assured that the explanation is false. [48]
So how did Durkheim consider social emergence? To begin 
with, his notion of “dynamic density” aligns him to particular the-
ories of social complexity and collective emergence very much 
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at odds with a contemporary reading of Tardean microsociology. 
In short, dynamic density is a process of social emergence that 
increases by way of the growing number and frequency of indi-
vidual connectivities. By way of his influence on Talcott Parsons’ 
functionalism, Durkheim has subsequently been claimed by a 
number of other authors as an early pioneer of systems theory 
and cybernetic approaches to the social, including notions of 
swarm, collective, and distributed intelligence. [49] So while Dur-
kheim’s social theory points to the downward causation awarded 
to social facts and collective representations, both of these con-
cepts are considered “sui generic.” That is, they emerge from out 
of a relation with their own social kind. Social emergence is thus 
independent of psychological and biological factors and derived 
instead from a social consciousness emerging from the dynamic 
densities (connectivities) made between individuals. [50]
Dynamic density is, incidentally, an account of social agency 
that can be linked to current network theory where there is also 
a heavy emphasis placed on the agency of collective behavior 
emerging from a network of individuals. [51] The synergy here 
is not precise, but worthy of note nonetheless. For Durkheim 
society is “not at all the illogical or a-logical, incoherent and 
fantastic being” others consider it to be. On the contrary “the 
collective consciousness… is the consciousness of the conscious-
nesses.” [52] The organic glue that brings social collectives to-
gether (makes it conscious, as such) is founded in the collective 
consensus of individuals. Similarly, in network theory, individ-
uals become “individuals of a different sort.” It is, as such, the 
localized level of “consensus-building” that links the individual 
“to the swarm as a whole.” [53]
In lieu of Durkheim’s concentration on a conscious social 
category arising from out of associative individual densities, 
devoid of biological or psychological content, Tarde’s diagram 
comprises of mostly unconscious flows of desire, passion, and 
imitative radiations of muscular, as well as cerebral activities. In 
sharp contrast then, Tarde’s society of imitation does not fall 
back on collective or individual representations. It is not at all 
about pure association as it concerns the disassociated connec-
tivity (unconscious association) of a social somnambulist. Like 
this, Tarde’s social becomes an assemblage of relationality com-
posed of self-spreading and mesmeric imitative waves or flows. 
[54] What comes together does not occur by way of a collective 
consciousness pushing down on the individual, but is instead the 
“coherent” outcome of “desires that have been excited or sharp-
ened by certain [social] inventions,” which imitatively radiate 
outward, point-to-point, assembling what appear to be the logi-
cal arrangements of social form, like markets, nations and cities. 
[55] What radiates outwards are neither social facts nor collec-
tive representations, but the microrelations of shared passions, 
thoughts, conversations, beliefs, feelings and affects which pass 
through porous self/other relations in all manner of contagious 
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environments, including corporate, economic and political are-
nas. [56] What comes together “socially” in these Tardean spaces 
is neither genetically subject-bound nor obligated to the wisdom 
of collective consensus, but is rather the outcome of an infra-in-
dividual relation that spreads below consciousness. The social, 
according to Tarde, is a vital force that self-spreads, radiates and 
vibrates out from capricious mechanism-independent social en-
counters with events and accidents.
3. WHAT DIAGRAM?
Networks?
So beyond deterministic thinking, what kind of diagram can 
be used to study the force of these encounters in contemporary 
contagious environments? Is it, as Galloway and Thacker pro-
pose, the nodes and the edges of the technical network? [57] 
Well, in part yes. Network fever is indeed all-pervasive. Neverthe-
less, in ontological terms, the network diagram has certain ex-
planatory limitations that need to be considered. Galloway and 
Thacker’s own dissatisfaction with the graph theories of network 
science, for example, point to a tendency to attribute unfettered 
and apolitical naturalness to what are in effect asymmetrical top-
ological spaces. [58] Yet, these limitations seem to be further 
heightened by the spatial homogeneity of temporal consider-
ations. Although Galloway goes on to interestingly locate the 
event in the “emergence of the networked form of mediation” 
in itself, [59] we should perhaps not altogether ignore the opin-
ions expressed in network science which openly acknowledge 
that these topological spaces, standardized by nodes and edges, 
tend to freeze out the temporality of what just occurred (the 
event). [60]
This solidifying effect is not only a problem in the nodes and 
edges of network science, but in other theories of the network 
too. Despite drawing on Tarde as a “thinker of networks” [61] 
to support the agency to objects, a distributed personhood, and 
emphasize invention over cognitive reflection, actor network 
theory (ANT) is weakened, Thrift contends, by a tendency to 
sustain “effectivity.” [62]The problem with ANT is that it neu-
tralizes the intensity of events, giving precedence to “steely ac-
cumulation” over “lightening strikes,” and “sustained strategies” 
over “sharp movements.” [63] In fact, being able to map what 
just occurred — the shock events and accidents of present-day 
contagious spaces, like those recently experienced in the econ-
omy or fame obsessed cultural milieus introduced below — is of 
central concern to contagion theory. One important challenge 
then is to find an appropriate abstract diagram that better as-
similates these temporal considerations. [64] Indeed, what Tar-
de provides (and here the influence on Deleuze is made clear) 
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is an epidemiological diagram that exceeds a mere network of 
relations (technical or otherwise) and points instead toward a 
far more complex array of events and contagious assemblages of 
desire and social invention.
The Events of Financial Contagion
There are, it seems, legitimate reasons to suggest that the 
spreading of the recent financial crisis is linked to the growth 
of automated networks and so-called algotrading. [65] However, 
beyond the technological diagram there is another way to ap-
proach financial contagion. That is to utilize what Massumi calls 
the networkability of events. Like this, the temporal movement of 
the event is not simply limited to network connectivity and distri-
bution, [66] but is instead inextricably coupled to the manifold 
components of assemblages such as those that compose the cur-
rent turmoil in the economic system. The passing-on of financial 
contagion through these economic assemblages, for example, is 
of course greatly influenced by the digitalization and networking 
of financial information. Post-big bang electronic circuits have 
played a major role in speeding up and automating economic 
events and contagious spillovers. However, as Massumi proposes, 
the “medium of communication” of events and their subsequent 
contagions, is not the technology. [67] It is rather the events’ 
movability: its displacement, communicability and relationality.
It is useful at this point to refer to Tarde’s much earlier ac-
count of times of boom and bust so as to more concretely stress 
the significant role of the event in emergent economic relations. 
Tarde presents an economy assembled around the repetition of 
periodic events, but always prone to the occasional monstrous 
aperiodic shock event or accident. So as to explicate how these 
events affect the economy, he makes a clear distinction between 
two kinds of contagious desire. [68] The first are “periodically 
linked desires.” Organic life, Tarde noted, “need[s] to drink or 
eat,” clothe itself to ward off the cold, and so on. [69] These 
necessary desires related to survival become interwoven into the 
repetitious and mechanical habits of day-to-day events. However, 
when such desires become economically appropriated by social 
invention, they become “special” desire-events, and can as such, 
take on an imitative and spontaneous “life” of their own. Accord-
ing to Tarde, these are “capricious, non-periodic, desires” [70] 
for things like fashion and fame that organic life seems to pas-
sionately aspire toward, and imitate, mostly unaware of the mes-
meric and magnetic attraction they generate. On occasions, the 
intensity of these passions build anomalous financial bubbles, 
which continue to contagiously grow until they inevitably burst, 
spilling over into the wider economy. [71]
Along these lines, Thrift, and more recently Latour and 
Lépinay, have pointed to a revival of a Tardean political econ-
omy founded on the eventful passing-on of contagious desires, 
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passions, glories, and intoxications. [72] Like this, the current 
financial crisis demonstrates how the “reach and complexity 
[of imitative radiations] has expanded inordinately since Tar-
de’s time, allowing them undreamt of generative powers.” [73] 
The expansion of these flows of desire and imitative social in-
vention is accordingly linked to the growth of an economy driv-
en by “new socio-technical platforms,” including vast electronic 
networks and automated modes of trading, which not only in-
crease the fluidity and rapidity of financial information, but also 
“power up” the communication of desire via “conversations” and 
“hormonal splashes” spreading through the imitative meshwork 
of financial media. [74] Nonetheless, the networkability (and 
unpredictability) of the present-day economy, and its intimate 
coupling to fluctuations in the market mood, is a distinctly social 
phenomenon of a Tardean order. Although the economy can 
appear to be a “logical arrangement” of events organized around 
predictable network distributions, the backdrop by which desire 
becomes appropriated by social invention is merely “capricious 
and accidental.” [75]
The Accidents of Contagious Fame
Another way by which to effectively trace the accidents of con-
tagion in Tarde’s diagram is to consider how it accounts for the 
spreading of fame for those individuals “fortunate” enough to 
encounter ingenious ideas. Tarde’s study of the nineteenth-cen-
tury equivalent of celebrity worship argues that fame is seem-
ingly generated by small deferential social groups, before it be-
comes more widely dispersed into a public that “does not know 
its hero personally,” but nevertheless feels the same “fanatical, 
impassioned and devoted admiration.” [76] Yet, this jump from 
the respect of the few to the emotionally charged adulation of 
the many (again, mostly at-a-distance) is explicitly linked by Tar-
de to the spontaneity of encounter with complex “currents of 
imitation.” One person’s fame is, it would appear, an accidental 
unfolding of the events of their eventual glory. A point Tarde 
reinforces in Economic Psychology when he argues:
One can see… what is accidental about glory. Given equal 
natural genius, a man will or will not encounter ingenious ideas, 
depending on whether the elements of these ideas are or are not 
brought to him by the intersecting currents of imitation. And, 
given an equal ingeniousness of discovered ideas, they will make 
him illustrious or obscure depending on whether they do or do 
not encounter a public which desires them and is disposed to 
welcome. [77]
Although this account ingeniously points to an infectable de-
siring population as a necessary precondition for an epidemic 
of influence, it also draws attention to a particular criticism of 
how Tarde contends with the accidentality of what spreads. As 
Thrift points out, Tarde may well have overestimated the acci-
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dentalness of contagion, and negated, as such, the capacity for 
increasingly mediated encounters of imitation-suggestibility to 
be “consciously and carefully steered.” [78] While Tarde success-
fully grasps “the power of imitative processes in the mediated 
environments” of his time, [79] he tended to…
See these mediated processes as spreading like wildfire, like 
mobs all but out of control, or as currents pushing up against 
each other in a fluid dynamics in which ascendancy could be all 
but accidental. [80]
What Tarde seems not to have anticipated is the capacity 
of current corporate and political agencies, working with PR 
strategists, media experts, technologists, network scientists and 
so-called neuromarketers, to produce the necessary mood en-
vironments ripe for capturing the accidents of desire in social 
inventiveness, and making populations readily infectious. In 
present-day spaces of consumption there is, Thrift argues, “an 
ever-growing multiplicity and difference of celebrities and noto-
rieties buoyed up by persistent media attention.” [81] Celebrity 
is endemic to a media engineered desiring machine marketers 
and politicians compete with each other to plug into. This is a 
Tardean machinic diagram defined by “a potent combination 
of technology and genre, imitation and hormone,” [82]and the 
reproduction of infra-individuals readily primed to desire and 
pass on the inventions of celebrity hype to others.
To conclude this section there seem to be at least two dia-
grammatic alternatives to choose from. The first regards the 
diagram as Tarde seemed to, as all but accidental. The social 
somnambulist is merely an unconscious conduit through which 
the capricious currents of imitation flow. What spreads either 
catches on or simply dies, depending on the chance encounter 
with the logical contests and oppositions of imitative radiation. 
The second option is not however as straightforwardly non-acci-
dental as it is perhaps inferred above. On the contrary, it stress-
es how spontaneous events can be captured, measured, primed 
and organized, even made to look like an accident or chance 
encounter, so as to dip below conscious awareness and become 
more readily absorbed into the neurological unconsciousness. 
This last option has weighty implications for the future of hu-
man agency.
4. VIRAL AGENCY: IN BETWEEN SPONTANEITY AND 
DICTATORSHIP
The Tardean Social
The problem of human agency appropriately comes to the 
fore in Thacker’s microbial contagion theory. Again though, 
careful attention needs to be paid to such questions concern-
66 67
ing viral “life” and its seemingly counter relation to human life. 
These two vital forces are, it must be said, too often located on 
either side of the aforementioned artifice that divides social and 
biological domains. This artificial separation certainly reinforces 
the idea that there are “unknown” biological mechanisms func-
tioning outside of, and independent of, the social field. Yes “we 
humans” do encounter a whole host of nonhuman and human 
biological agencies mostly unawares (viruses, pheromones, hor-
mones, feelings, affects etc.). But that does not make such agen-
cy-free infectious encounters discrete from the social. As Tarde 
prophetically argues, the social is, for the most part, an involun-
tary association with all manner of affecting agencies that drift in 
and out of a somnambulistic disposition. Indeed, everything is a 
society. The agency of others, and the agency of other things, in-
tertwines, as such, with an impression of our own volition coun-
tered by an insensibility to the way our desires are excited and 
appropriated into social inventions, and how we become part of 
a repetitious and imitative rhythm of life. Importantly, human 
freewill and biological inclinations are regarded by Tarde as in-
separable. As he puts it:
Nothing… is less scientific than the establishment of this ab-
solute separation, of this abrupt break, between the voluntary 
and the involuntary, between the conscious and unconscious. 
Do we not pass by insensible degrees from deliberate volition to 
almost mechanical habit? [83]
Neuromarketing
Over a hundred years later and Tarde’s notion of the insepa-
rability of voluntary and involuntary behavior is becoming cen-
tral to biopolitical endeavors to organize consumptive labor. Just 
as Thrift argues that the contemporary exercise of biopower 
evident in network science closely follows a Tardean trajecto-
ry, [84] the so-called neuromarketing expert claims to be able 
to measure the inseparable and anesthetized degrees between 
conscious and unconscious consumption. Drawing on recent 
inventions in neuroscience to inform such business enterpris-
es, the neuromarketing expert claims to be able to gauge the 
spontaneous flows of consumer passion for services, brands and 
products. With ready access to advanced emotional recognition 
software and affective dataflows collected from the “user testing” 
of consumption experiences increasingly delivered online and 
through mobile devices, these highly qualified experts endeavor 
to prime environments for future purchase intent. Blending eye 
tracking software with electroencephalography (EEG) and gal-
vanic skin response (GSR), companies like Berkeley based Neu-
roFocus not only measure a consumer’s cognitive attention and 
memory retention, but claim to directly tap into what a consum-
er “feels about a product.” [85] The combination of eye move-
ment with the measurement of electrical activity in the brain, 
heart rate, and skin temperature to effectively record a user’s 
emotional arousal during consumption, supplants the subjective 
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inaccuracies of older marketing techniques of self-reporting, 
like questionnaires, surveys and focus groups.
Another innovation from the Danish company, iMotions, flags 
a distinct Tardean turn in market research technology. Distinct 
from slightly older methods that tended to measure either volun-
tary attention (bodily gestures, orientation, voice intonation, eye 
contact and evasion, and nervous responses) or involuntary inat-
tention(increases in heart, pulse and breathing rates, and body 
temperature and sweating) the Emotion Tool claims to tap into 
the relation between the two. It targets, as such, the space in 
between the implicit, unconscious part of the brain (the limbic 
system), which is widely recognized as being hardwired to the 
nervous system and physical reactions, and the explicit, conscious 
system (the frontal cortex) associated with cognitive attention. It 
is the somatic memory, physical responses and emotions of the 
implicit system that are supposed to prime or guide the explicit 
system. [86] As the developer of the Emotion Tool claims:
It is now generally accepted that emotions dominate cog-
nition, the mental process of the ability to think, reason and 
remember. Therefore, there is a rapidly increasing interest in 
methods that can tap into these mostly subconscious emotion-
al processes, in order to gain knowledge and understanding of 
consumer behavior. [87]
The Emotion Tool tracks facial expressions, particularly those 
that occur around the eyes, the amount of blinking, the dura-
tion of the gaze, along with pupil dilation to measure emotional 
engagement. It further incorporates an algorithmic assessment 
of two dimensions of the emotional responses captured by the 
technology: emotional strength and affective valence. The first gaug-
es the level of excitement an external stimulus provokes in the 
consumer, the second, measures the feelings that follow the 
stimulus — the degree of attraction or aversion that an individ-
ual feels toward a specific object or event. Scores are calculated 
from a range of pleasant, unpleasant, or neither pleasant nor 
unpleasant. High scores are defined as “affective,” low scores 
“unaffective.”
Neuromarketing ushers in new methods of persuasion de-
signed to sidestep the cognitive realm of visual representation 
and tap into the implicit, unconscious affective systems of con-
sumption. Over and above focusing on what a consumer cog-
nitively consumes in terms of visual attention (assumed to be 
atop of the Kantian hierarchy of the senses), neuromarketers 
measure the streams of affect the user somatically absorbs in 
the atmosphere. As the enthusiastic CEO of NeuroFocus puts it, 
a combination of techniques helps the marketer to go beyond 
conscious consumer engagement with a product and actively 
seek out what unconsciously attracts them.
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Absorption is the ideal because it signifies that the consum-
er’s brain has not only registered your marketing message or 
your creative content, but that the other centers of the brain that 
are involved with emotions and memory have been activated as 
well. The latest advances in neuroscience have revealed that all 
three of these key elements — attention, emotion and memory 
retention — are essential to the formation of what we call “per-
suasion”- which in turn means purchase intent. [88]
This inherently Tardean appeal to the indivisible neurolog-
ical space between volition and mechanical habit suggests that 
“subliminal advertising,” as Thrift notes, “does work.” [89]
Resistance to Imitation?
Indeed, the biopolitical and biophilosophical implications of 
these many attempts to contaminate mood by appealing to the 
intersection point at which social encounter and biological hard-
wiring meet are far reaching. With a similar focus on contagious 
empathic transfers, particularity those established in echoic rela-
tions with objects of art, Barbara Maria Stafford makes, as such, 
a radical intervention into the old dichotomy between rational 
freewill and ideological false consciousness. [90] By noting how 
the imitative relation with the other begins entirely with the in-
voluntary encounter, she combines the mirror neuron hypothe-
sis with an implicit Tardean perspective. This is perhaps how hu-
mans co-exist with nonhuman agents. Not so much by way of the 
battle lines of microbial warfare, but through the contamination 
of mood. Markets, marketers and politicians are, it seems, begin-
ning to fathom out how to more effectively recognize and repro-
duce affective atmospheres able to ripen the social mood and 
make it ready for capricious contagious overspills. Horrendous 
as these neurological contagions may seem to be, the potential 
to discern spontaneous epidemic flows of affect, to educate the 
senses, and become decontaminated from empathic and mes-
meric transfers, at least provides a possible path of resistance to 
the horrors of such a dictatorship. There are indeed a number 
of authors who have approached the subject of counter-conta-
gion and by way of concluding this essay I will briefly refer to the 
various ideas put forward.
The question of how to resist imitation-suggestibility is of 
course complicated by Tarde’s insistence that what spreads con-
taminates the entire affective valence of the emotional landscape. 
So while Teresa Brennan and Michael Hardt have forwarded 
love as a way of learning to feel the sensations of others and 
discern the negative affect of a love gone bad, [91] the virality 
of a Tardean love seems to evade the affirmative power of loving 
attention. Viral love can, like a hypnotist, steer unconscious de-
sires and fascinations, guiding attention and influencing beliefs 
and decision-making processes by way of visceral contamination.
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Nonetheless, Thrift points to a potential resistance movement 
actualized from within the biopolitics of imitation: a social inven-
tion organized around the very “speed and imitative capacities” 
of the networks that function otherwise to denigrate democra-
cy. [92] What this infers is a counter politics of imitation that 
spreads not by way of love, but similarly through sympathy. [93] 
We might consider here attempts to trigger counter-contagions 
in the shape of vigils, gathering protests, online petitions, and 
campaigns and fund raising. Yet, once again, Tarde’s skepticism 
concerning counter-imitation needs to be noted.
In counter-imitating one another, that is to say, in doing or 
saying the exact opposite of what they observe being done or 
said, they are becoming more and more assimilated, just as much 
assimilated as if they did or said precisely what was being done 
or said around them… there is nothing more imitative than 
fighting against one’s natural inclination to follow the current of 
these things, or than pretending to go against it. [94]
In short then, in becoming an adversary, one simply becomes 
more associated in the assemblage of imitation. This is how, 
Tarde contends, in the process of nonverbal communication, 
opposing facial expressions do not simply oppose people, but 
unconsciously associate them in an assemblage of imitation and 
counter-imitation.
One way in which we might become disconnected from this 
associative chain is through the suppression of empathy and 
refusal to engage in the transmission of affects, emotions and 
feelings of others. But of course Tarde does not accept the Kan-
tian proposition of apathy. Such a break in communication with 
the outside word is regarded as impossible. On the contrary, in 
order to break from these associative chains he makes a crucial 
distinction between counter-imitation and non-imitation. [95] 
In sharp contrast to sympathy, empathy, and indeed apathy, Tar-
de’s non-imitation is achieved through pure antipathy. This is 
not therefore a disconnection or non-social relation, but is a 
non-imitation of, and thus anti-social relation with a “neighbor 
who is in touch.” [96]
What Tarde proposes as an alternative seems to counterintu-
itively reject Hardt’s love of difference as a way to achieve spon-
taneous democracy insofar as he offers a distinctly cognizant “re-
fusal . . . to copy the dress, customs, language, industry, and arts 
which make up the civilization of [this or that] neighborhood.” 
[97] Non-imitation requires a constant assertion of antagonism, 
“obstinacy,” “pride,” and “indelible feelings of superiority,” that 
empowers and produces a “rupture of the umbilical cord be-
tween the old and the new society.” [98] It involves a declaration 
that all other societies are “absolutely and forever alien,” and an 
undertaking to never reproduce the rights, usages, and ideas of 
any other society. It is indeed non-imitation that Tarde contends 
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purges the social of the contagions of the other. It is only after 
this purge that old customs can be replaced by truly new fash-
ions. For Tarde then, it is the long term maintenance of non-imi-
tation which ensures that those who wish to resist the contagions 
of the present political climate will in a moment of spontaneous 
revolution “no longer find any hindrance in the way of [their 
own] conquering activity.” [99]
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‘Tarde as Media Theorist’
an interview with Tony D. Sampson
by Jussi Parikka
@Theory, Culture & Society Journal (2013)
This discussion focuses on Sampson’s recently published 
monograph Virality: Contagion Theory in the Age of Networks, char-
acterised by Brian Rotman as “offering a new theory of the viral 
as a sociological event.” In this conversation, Parikka and Samp-
son talk about Gabriel Tarde and assemblage theory, and why 
Tarde should be approached as a media theorist who is more in-
terested in the somnambulistic notions of the social. Sampson’s 
interest in the non-cognitive – and non-cognitive capitalism – 
resonates with recent discussions of affect, but with a special fo-
cus on developments in HCI-design and research.
___
Jussi Parikka: I would like to start by asking why you are approach-
ing your topic – contemporary network culture – via Gabriel Tarde, a 
19th century social theorist? What is it that affords Tarde to be seen as 
a suitable theoretical source for an analysis of digital network culture, 
where agency does not lie only in human contagion, but also non-human 
actors?
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selves on social phenomena. Once that artifice is removed we 
nevertheless see that it is the other way round. The biological is 
always social, and it’s the social that is contagious. So what I in Vi-
rality call a resuscitation of Tarde positions him as a media theorist 
within a nature-society zone of indistinction. This wasn’t hard 
to do. After all, when he writes about imitative radiation or imi-
tation-suggestibility, Tarde is really pointing to a monadological 
mediation that does not distinguish between humans and non-
humans, just as it does not seek to separate nonconscious from 
conscious states or mechanical habit from a sense of volition. As 
he puts it, all phenomena are social phenomena, all things a so-
ciety. So like Whitehead to some extent, he put atoms, cells, and 
people on an equal footing: a society of things. This is why I also 
think it important to stress that there are networks in crowds and 
crowds in networks.
JP: Virality pitches an intriguing idea about somnambulist media 
theory – can you talk a bit more about that concept and its relation to 
non-volition?
TS: Again the somnambulist comes from Tarde, of course, 
and what I try to do in the book is grasp how this concept res-
onates with network culture. It seems to me that the tendency 
toward contagion in networks seems to be related to the implicit 
Tony Sampson: It was Tiziana Terranova who first suggested 
Tarde, quite some time ago now. I was trying to think through 
these ideas I had about the contagions of network culture. I had, 
up until that point, been trying to develop an assemblage theory 
approach to networks referring to material from network and 
computer science. I wanted to keep well away from metaphor-
ical renderings of digital contagion, which seemed to me to be 
the worst possible starting place. This approach worked OK, to 
a point, but Tarde’s imitation thesis opened up a lot of new pos-
sibilities. Interestingly I was able to take another look at Deleuze 
through Tarde’s work. It was like coming at him from a fresh 
direction. Although Deleuze didn’t write a book on Tarde – and 
I wish he had – he was, I think, influenced by him as much as he 
was by Spinoza, Bergson or Nietzsche. This is the point François 
Dosse makes in Intersecting Lives. Mainly, Tarde allowed me to 
reread assemblage theory as a social theory or more precisely a 
theory of social subjectivation. I would say that Tarde is possibly 
the first assemblage theorist insofar that he is only really con-
cerned with desire and social relationality.
Another important thing about Tarde’s role in Virality is that 
he does not distinguish between nature and society or similarly 
between biology and culture. He helped me as such to break 
through the artifice of metaphorical contagion which makes 
it seem like the biological is always invading the social, at least 
where biological language and rhetoric seem to impose them-
82 83
brain functions that Tarde describes as unconscious associations 
– through which he contends that the social assembles itself. This 
relation between virality and nonconscious association could be 
grasped as the spreading of a capricious state of false conscious, 
if you like, wherein, on one hand, the social is infected at the 
infra level of brain function by imitation-suggestibility, and on 
the other hand, we find that everyone is just kept too busy, and 
too distracted, to really grasp that their shared feelings are being 
steered toward this goal or that goal. The idea of sleepwalking 
media, or media hypnosis, is similar in many ways to Jonathan 
Crary’s work on attentive technologies. Crary in fact provides a 
wonderful repositioning of the attention economy thesis. Unlike 
the account given by business school gurus who see attention as 
a precious resource to be fought over, he grasps the controlling 
and disciplinary nature of attention. Fuller and Goffey have 
similarly referred to this as the inattention economy, which like 
Crary does not distinguish between attention and inattention. 
They are not polar opposites.
JP: Related to those ideas, you insist on talking about non-cognitive 
capitalism and its techniques. Why this emphasis that takes you in a 
slightly different direction than the previous years of discourse in cultural 
and political theory about cognitive capitalism? What is it that makes 
this approach different?
TS: So yes non-cognitive capitalism does not stray too far from 
the familiar Taylorist and post-Taylorist flow of labour. In terms 
of human-computer work we might think of this as a shift from 
ergonomic relations; the best possible physical fit established be-
tween human and machine during the labour process, if you 
like, toward a cognitive model focused on mental labour. We see 
this shift between paradigms everywhere in Human Computer 
Interaction (HCI) literature and practices, but now something 
else seems to be happening. The emphasis is increasingly on the 
labour of emotions, affect and experience. These are measured 
using biometric and neurotechnologies alongside more tradi-
tional cognitive tools that probe memory and attention.  This is 
just one aspect of the neuroculture we find ourselves in today 
where it is not the person, but the neuron, or perhaps the neu-
rotransmission itself, that is being put to work in all kinds of ways 
to produce a new kind of molecular subjectivity.
It was not until the latter stages of writing the book that I 
started to read the social psychologist Robert Zajonc’s work on 
preferences needing no inferences; that is to say his idea that 
feelings might have thoughts of their own. Indeed, if market-
ers, political strategists and designers can make us feel a certain 
way then they can also influence the way we think. This mirrors 
a trend in commercial design at the moment to grasp the im-
portance of the relation between emotions and cognition. Za-
jonc goes even further though by saying that affective systems 
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are both independent of, and possibly stronger than, cognitive 
systems. Potentially then marketers, politicians and designers 
needn’t bother appealing to thought at all. This is the trajectory 
I think non-cognitive capitalism follows. In addition to the la-
bour of neurotransmission there is also this well publicized shift 
in media technology to so-called ubicomp. I think this is impor-
tant too. Here we see nontask interactions also occurring below 
attentiveness. Pervasive computing works by producing interac-
tions that work on the user simply by way of the user coming into 
contact with a “hot” zone or becoming part of a device-to-device 
network, triggering an event that they need never know about.
JP: Your ideas seem to relate closely to Evil Media, a recent book 
by Matthew Fuller and Andrew Goffey. Is there a wider interest in the 
non-communicative, and non-representational sort of aspects of media 
culture? 
TS: Absolutely, this is why I was so pleased to do my first Viral-
ity talk with Matt and Andy at Goldsmiths. I think there’s a nice 
synchrony between my book and what they call the unobtrusive 
greyness of certain media practices. This is not solely the strate-
gic use of media for specific goals, or the uncovering of some 
embedded or hidden ideology, but instead points to the unin-
tended, the re-appropriated or the steering of accidents that just 
crop up. I wrote about the immunologic stratagem as a kind of 
deceptive fearmongering originating from the accidents of com-
puter science in the 1970s and 80s. This is how I see viral cul-
ture. It’s not as viral marketing would like it to be – a step-by-step 
procedure that leads to effective zero cost marketing. Instead 
we find that the digital entrepreneur needs to nurse virality into 
being by priming brands so that they become stickier than their 
rivals and their potential to spread all the more likely. In network 
marketing nothing is for certain. All you can really do is bide 
your time while waiting to navigate the next accident. 
Another connection I’ve recently made to Evil Media is with 
the artist group YoHa. They asked for contributions to their Evil 
Media, Curiosity Cabinet project which is being exhibited in Berlin 
in the New Year. I’ve opted for Modafinil. This neuropharma-
ceutical is mainly used to treat sleeping disorders, some of which 
are related directly to malfunctioning labour processes, like 
shift work disorders. That’s hideous enough, but the greyness of 
Modafinil becomes apparent in its off-label uses by students and 
soldiers who need to keep attentive in the university exam and 
on the battlefield.
JP: Although the difference from Evil Media seems to be that you talk 
of love in your book too – can you elaborate on that point, relating to 
affects? 
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TS: So there is this really intriguing Machiavellian thing go-
ing on in Evil Media, right? It is fear that is preferable to love. 
My work simply turns that idea on its head. Tarde writes on love 
in several places, in his novel Underground Man and the extral-
ogical part of The Laws of Imitation. He thinks that love is, albeit 
often transitory, far more catching than fear. He also regards 
it an asymmetrical power relation in which it is mostly those in 
love who copy their beloved. I took inspiration from that and a 
couple of others. Teresa Brennan, for example, writes that love, 
unlike fear, does not need a medium to cling to. Love for Bren-
nan is both affect and medium at the same time, which sort of 
boosts its affective contagion. Michael Hardt’s love as a political 
concept is also interesting to me. His notion that the love of fam-
ily, race, god and nation tends to unify populations in ways that 
are “bad” becomes significant, I think, to understanding love as 
a far more effective and sinister Trojan than fear. Indeed, just 
because an experience makes you feel good doesn’t mean it will 
be good for you. I look at Obama love like this – as a kind of grey 
viral media practice of love. Aside from the obvious uses of love 
in his campaign, like the I Love Obama websites, T-shirts and 
badges, there are also those haptic images of Obama, with his 
family on the eve of his first election victory. We hear how this 
very cool guy wants to make a new partnership with the Middle 
East and close Guantanamo, but all we get are surges in troop 
numbers, his initial support for the Mubarak regime, and the 
relentless rise of the drones. His supporters say that he wants to 
see Guantanamo closed down, so he’s either deceitful or totally 
ineffective. That’s the greyness of Obama love. 
JP: One of the most intriguing bits in the book is when you look into 
concrete technologies that are emerging, like such interface design tech-
niques that tap into the involuntary. Is this another sort of a level of 
affect modulation, for instance in emotion/affect based interface design, 
and how does it relate to the recent wider debate concerning “affect” in 
cultural theory? 
TS: I see somnambulist media theory as a useful way to un-
derstand the so-called third paradigm of HCI. This is the move 
to exploit emotions and affect, social context, and experience 
processing already mentioned. Indeed, as a part of this shift, 
experience design consultancies and neuromarketers are fast 
becoming the next big thing in the persuasion business. Their 
biggest customers are apparently the banks and other financial 
institutions. Not surprisingly these enterprises have an image 
problem at the moment. So they are keen to tap into the poten-
tial to connect the end user to their brand via the visceral level 
of experience processing, appealing straight to the gut. This is 
what emotional design promises to do. 
This stuff is slowing taking hold. I’ve attended a number of 
design related industry events lately where biometric techniques 
are being put into practice by the designers of apps, advergames 
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and eCommerce, for example. They are enthusiastically hooking 
up user generated affect to GSR [galvanic skin response] and 
EEG [electroencephalography] devices which can work along-
side facial and posture recognition software and eye tracking 
technology to explore how states of arousal across the affective 
valence might correspond to such things as brand identification 
and purchase intent. There is a desire here to understand what 
is happening to the user at the nonconscious level of experience 
processing so that brands can be primed and users steered to-
ward certain windows of opportunity. 
Again these concrete practices are steeped in greyness. These 
technologies and methods were initially intended for neurolog-
ical treatment of conditions like ADD and dementia. There are 
no hidden agendas in their repurposing though. There is no ef-
fort to cover up the intrusiveness of these marketing techniques. 
The practice of persuasion, which became something of a taboo 
in old media arenas, has returned, it would seem, with a venge-
ance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Crowd, Power and Post-democracy  
 in the 21st Century
by Obsolete Capitalism
@Obsolete Capitalism blog (2013)
‘Rural fascism and city or neighborhood fascism, youth fascism and 
war veteran’s fascism... fascism of the couple, family, school, and office. 
Only the micro-fascism can answer the global question: “why does desire 
long for its repression? how can it desires its very own repression?”’
— Gilles Deleuze, Fèlix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus
On the micro-fascism
Obsolete Capitalism Let us start from the analysis Wu Ming set 
out in their brief essay Grillismo: Yet another right-wing cult coming from 
Italy and which interprets Grillo’s Five Star Movement as a new author-
itarian right-wing faction. Why did the desire for change of much of the 
electorate long once again for its very repression? We seem to witness the 
re-affirmation of Wilhelm Reich’s thought: at a given moment in history 
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the masses wanted fascism. The masses have not been deceived: they have 
understood very well the danger of authoritarianism; but they have voted 
it anyway. Even more worrying is that the authoritarian Berlusconi’s 
Freedom People (PDL) and Grillo’s Five Star Movement (M5S) conquer 
more than half of the Italian electorate together. A very similar situation 
arose in the UK in May 2013, with the UKIP’s exploit in the latest local 
elections. Why and in what measure are the toxins of authoritarianism 
and micro-fascism present in contemporary European society?
Tony D. Sampson I’d like to think this through using Tarde’s 
somnambulist as the situation seems to lend itself to a theory of 
sleepwalking subjects, but this approach should also have a UK 
political context. So yes, once again, we are faced with a surge in 
rightwing populism, particularly here in my home county of Es-
sex: a much maligned county east of London along the Thames 
Estuary. Across the UK the rise of the right should not really be 
a surprise. The working poor and unemployed have been hit 
hard by the Tory cuts. They need someone to blame and polit-
ical forces like UKIP, BNP and EDL (English Defence League) 
have just the (one) policy to do that: they blame the “Others”. 
Moreover though, many of these people have completely turned 
their backs on the left. This is partly due to the Thatcher-Mur-
doch demonizations in the 1980s, but it’s also due to the fail-
ure of the kind of bourgeois democracy they experienced under 
New Labour. Blair’s “third way” decimated left thinking in the 
middle ground. He moved the centre left further to the right 
than the Tories with his public-private initiatives and laissez-faire 
approach to banking and communications. Now we have the 
coalition and their insulting mantra of “we’re all in this togeth-
er.” Unemployment is on the increase, along with mini-jobs and 
their derisory contracts. The Liberals used to soak up the popu-
lar protest vote. No one believed they could ever really get into 
power. But they did! The illusion of bourgeois democracy is now 
exposed, which is a good thing, but this could also mean that 
many people in Essex turn even further to the right. 
This broad macropolitical failure does not however explain it 
all. At the microsocial level of the “people” we are, it seems, see-
ing the continuance of a fascistic political unconscious. In Essex 
the people have voted Tory for years. Indeed, the question the 
left have been asking for a long time now is why people in this 
neglected London overspill support a political class of expen-
sively educated, career politicians whose policies contradict their 
own interests? Is this a people who seek their own repression? So 
yes Reich’s question is pertinent once again. We need to try to 
rethink what seemed to him to be the perverse impulses of the 
fascist unconscious; a desire for repression that seeps through 
the layers into conscious rational choices. Why do so many peo-
ple desire this kind of popular fascism? They are aware. They are 
not deceived. The fascist brain is caught up in a mixture of rebel-
lious emotions and reactionary ideas against the putrid centre 
ground. But it is not democracy they desire. They are in need of 
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a religion to protect them from the chaos. They crave authority, 
as Reich argued. They desire belief. 
While Reich’s binary thinking may have famously helped him 
to mistake the desire to be repressed for an irrational perver-
sion of an otherwise rational state, he did point out that Marx-
ist sociology offers an equally binary perspective of the desiring 
machine. They had it wrong about mass psychology. Contrary 
to how we perceive the masses through the lenses of Marxist 
thinking, they do not perceive themselves as a hard done by pro-
letariat pitched against the bourgeoisie elite. Desire does not 
have a class distinction hidden inside. As Reich points out, the 
Marxist ideal of abolishing private property seems to clash with 
the people’s desire for all kinds of commodities. He mentioned 
shirts, pants, typewriters, toilet paper, books etc, but today we 
can add iphones and flat screen TVs. They also seem not the 
least concerned if it is the state or the private sector that appro-
priates their surplus labour. No surprise then that the promises 
of a return to the student protests of 1968 all but fizzled out in 
the winter of 2011. Indeed, it was the English summer riots that 
emerged as a much greater force. But this was no Arab Spring. 
Nobody took over Trafalgar Square. They went straight to the 
shopping mall. Perhaps the rioter’s desire to loot needs to be 
grasped as a kind of perversion of the desire to shop.
1919, 1933, 2013. On the crisis
OC In 2008 Slavoj Zizek said that when the normal run of things is 
traumatically interrupted, the field is open for a ‘discursive’ ideological 
competition. In Germany in the early 1930s Hitler won the competition 
to determine which narrative would explain the reasons for the crisis of 
the Weimar Republic — the Jewish conspiracy and the corruption of po-
litical parties. Zizek ends his reflection by stating that the expectations of 
the radical left to get scope for action and gain consent may be deceptive 
as populist or racist formations will prevail: the Greek Golden Dawn, 
the Hungarian Fidesz, the French Front National, the UK Independence 
Party are examples. Italy has had farcical groups such as the Lega Nord 
or the recent Five Star Movement, a bizarre rassemblement that seems 
to combine Reverend Jones People’s Temple with Syriza, or ‘revolution-
ary boyscoutism’ with the disciplinarism of the societies of control. How 
can one escape the crisis? What discursive, possibly-winning narratives 
should be developed? Are the typically Anglo-Saxon neo-Keynesian poli-
tics an answer or, on the countrary, is it the new authoritarian populism 
that will prevail?
TS Perhaps I need to begin by realizing the limits of a my phil-
osophical approach in this context. I cannot provide a discursive 
formation. It’s about relational concepts rather than a series of 
logical propositions. This will not lead to that. We need to ap-
proach discursive formations by exposing the nondiscursive rela-
tions of encounter with events. For example, we can ask how the 
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microsocial encounters macrolevel politics. What are the new 
layers of experience that succeed Reich? What is it that viscerally 
appeals to the “people” of Essex?  Perhaps it is fear! There is the 
Eastern European conspiracy/contagion here (they are coming 
for our jobs and benefits). They blame it on the Muslims too 
(they want to kill us all). What escape do we have from these 
formations? What kind of intervention could clear away the fog 
of populism that obscures affirmative felt relations: the empathy 
all repressed people should have in common with each other. 
On the missing people
OC Mario Tronti states that ‘there is populism because there is no 
people.’ That of the people is an enduring theme which Tronti disclaims 
in a very Italian way: ‘the great political forces use to stand firmly on 
the popular components of the social history: the Catholic populism, the 
socialist tradition, the diversity in communism. Since there was the peo-
ple, there was no populism.’ Paul Klee often complained that even in 
historical artistic avant-gardes ‘it was people who were lacking.’ However 
the radical critique to populism has led to important results: the birth of 
a mature democracy in America; the rise of the theory and the practice of 
revolution in the Tsarist Empire, a country plagued by the contradictions 
of a capitalist development in an underdeveloped territory (Lenin and 
bolshevism). Tronti carries on in his tranchant analysis of the Italian 
and European backgrounds: ‘In today’s populism, there is no people and 
there is no prince. It is necessary to beat populism because it obscures the 
relations of power.’ Through its economic-mediatic-judicial apparatuses, 
neopopulism constantly shapes “trust-worthy people” similar to the “cus-
tomers portfolio” of the branded world of neoliberal economy: Berlusconi’s 
“people” have been following the deeds of Arcore’s Sultan for twenty years; 
Grillo’s followers are adopting similar all-encompassing identifying pro-
cesses, giving birth to the more confused impulses of the Italian social 
strata. With institutional fragility, fluctuating sovereignties and the 
oblivion of left-wing dogmas (class, status, conflict, solidarity, equality) 
how can we form people today? Is it possible to reinvent an anti-author-
itarian people? Is it only the people or also politics itself that is lacking?
TS One source of the fog of populism is the seemingly recip-
rocal relation between the people and the media. While some 
coverage of the protests in Turkey are appearing at the backend 
of BBC news reports, top of the most watched/listened to list on 
the news website have been items relating to the price of the new 
PS4, interest in Apple’s new look for iOS 7; and live video cover-
age from Westminster Abbey of a special service to mark the 60th 
anniversary of the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II. The media 
has also perpetuated the rise of the loveable rightwing buffoon: 
UKIP’s Nigel Farage and the Tories’ Boris Johnson.  These right-
wing conceptual personae help to obscure power relations in 
the UK, which are rapidly sinking back to a people dominated 
by those “born to rule” Bullingdon bullies.(1) 
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So yes, I agree with Tronti’s point that you raise, about the 
people being missing from populism, or at least, to put it anoth-
er way, they are difficult to make out in all this fog. A new people 
need to be found.
On Control
OC In Postscript on the Societies of Control, published in 1990, Gilles 
Deleuze states that, thanks to the illuminating analyses of Michel Fou-
cault, a new diagnosis of contemporary Western society has emerged. 
Deleuze’s analysis is as follows: control societies have replaced disciplinary 
societies at the beginning of the twentieth century. He writes that ‘mar-
keting is now the instrument of social control and it forms the impudent 
breed of our masters.’ Let us evaluate who stands beyond two very suc-
cessful electoral adventures such as Forza Italia (Berlusconi’s first party) 
and M5S: respectively Publitalia 80 owned by Marcello Dell’Utri, and 
Casaleggio Associati owned by Gianroberto Casaleggio. The incontrovert-
ible fact that two marketing companies stand behind these political pro-
jects reinforces Deleuze’s analysis. Mechanisms of control, media events 
such as exit polls and infinite surveys, im/penetrable databases, data as 
commodities, continuous spin doctoring, influencers that lead consen-
sus on the net, opaque bots, digital squads, dominant echo-chambering. 
Evil media. These are the determinations of post-ideological (post-demo-
cratic?) neoliberalism. The misery of the new control techniques competes 
only with that of the glass house of transparency (web-control, of course). 
Jacques Ranciere says we live in the epoch of post- politics: how can we 
get out of the neo-liberal cage and free ourselves from the ideological con-
sensus of its electoral products? What will the reconfiguration of left-wing 
politics be after the exhaustion of Marxist hegemony?
TS We not only need to find the people, but also better grasp 
what their desires might be. With this in mind, it is perhaps in-
teresting to look at the rhetoric of contagion deployed by the 
Tories. They do not want to defend their privilege, they say; they 
want to spread it! (2)
This is the sort of hollow discourse that is easy to see through, 
but a little harder to resist. Not simply because the relations of 
power are dominated by the privileged, but because the “peo-
ple” desire the inventions of privilege. The somnambulist sub-
ject is lead by example so much so that the examples he desires 
become incarnated in him. He desires to become the example 
that is copied. In Essex the sleepwalkers are caught up in their 
passionate interest in becoming rich businessmen, footballers, 
celebrities, soldiers, gangsters. Of course most people never get 
anywhere near to what they aspire to be, but are forever striving 
for it. So if you cannot become what you aspire to be, the next 
best option is to continue to follow the example. Where else is 
there to go? Desire needs somewhere to go.
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Not that every example is unobtainable. It is fairly easy to be-
come a soldier in Essex or at least pretend to be one by lining 
up in support of “our” boys through thick and thin, through 
legal and illegal wars. This is the threat posed by the EDL. Tarde 
would have described these people as somnambulists; not mere-
ly unconscious beings, but unconscious by association. 
The Tory think tanks grasp this thing about examples well, 
I think. They employed an aspirational Essex man to become 
their voice in the popular press. Andy Coulson (now charged 
with phone hacking) worked his way up from a local Essex news-
paper to become the editor of Murdoch’s poisonous tabloids. 
He was introduced to counter the Eton accents with the voice 
of working class aspiration. They needn’t have bothered be-
cause the working class in Essex have long been in love with the 
posh. The recent rise of rightwing buffoonery has arrived via a 
long held passion for inventions like Saatchi’s Thatcher and the 
much older Royal brand that seems to continue to soak up the 
desire to be repressed. 
As Reich said, the working classes do not see themselves as a 
struggling proletariat. They see themselves in mixture with the 
middle classes. That’s not a bad thing. Any modicum of change 
would require the involvement of all. However, unlike Turkey at 
this moment where it is the young middle classes who are will-
ing to be on the streets in the protests, the left leaning middle 
classes here in Essex are hiding in their cosy enclaves. They have 
too much to lose. Even the growing instability of their jobs in 
the City is not enough (yet) to get them out on the streets or 
anywhere near their poorer neighbours. So what would it take to 
shake them out of their neoliberal cages?
On the Googlization of politics; the financial side of digi-
populism
OC The first decade of the 21st century has been characterized by the 
rise of neo-capitalism, referred to as cognitive; in this context a company 
like Google has established itself as the perfect synthesis of web-business 
as it does not compensate, if not in a small part, the content-carriers it 
lists. In Italy, following the electoral success of the Five Star Movement we 
witnessed a mutation of the typical prosumer of social networks: the new 
figure of the “prosumer-voter” was in fact born on Grillo’s blog - being 
essentially the one and only channel of information of the movement. The 
blog is a commercial activity and the high number of contacts and daily 
access has steadily increased in the last year. This digital militancy pro-
duces incomes both in the form of advertising and online sales of products 
such as DVDs, books and other material associated with the movement. 
All of this leads to the risk of googlization of politics whereby the modes of 
financing political activity radically change because of the “network sur-
plus-value” - an expression coined by the researcher Matteo Pasquinelli to 
define that portion of incomes extracted from the practices of the web pro-
sumers. Having said this, are we about to witness a shift of the financial 
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paradigm applied to politics? Will the fundings from powerful lobbies or 
the general public be replaced by micro-donations via web (in the style of 
Obama’s) and by the exploitation of the prosumer-voters? And if so, will 
the dominant ‘googlization of politics’ involve any particular risks?
TS In many ways this is a second front. The fear contagions 
perpetuated by the mainstream media only go so far. They need 
to be accompanied by the intimacy of something like Obama’s 
campaign. This is just the tip of a much bigger effort to tap into, 
to nudge, and to steer feelings via networks. This is a different 
kind of propaganda model though. The networking of Obama 
love has at its heart a user experience designer. The risk is that 
the contagion will be so well designed that we’ll be distracted 
enough and miss it. The best user experiences are invisible. 
On digital populism, on affective capitalism
OC James Ballard once said that after the religions of the Book we 
should expect those of the Web. Some claim that, in fact, a first techno-re-
ligion already exists in the form of Affective Capitalism whose technolog-
ical and communicative characteristics mirror those of network cultures. 
This notion of a secularized cult can be traced back to Walter Benjamin’s 
thought but is enriched by a very contemporary mix of affective manip-
ulation techniques, politics of neo-liberalism and political practices 2.0. 
The rise of the Five Stars Movement is the first successful example of 
italian digital populism; Obama’s campaign in the U.S.A. has witnessed 
an evolution of micro-targeting techniques - customized political offers 
via the web. The new frontier of both medical and economic research is 
producing a disturbing convergence of evolving ‘fields of knowledges’: 
control theories, neuro-economics and neuro-marketing. In 1976, in the 
optic of the ‘war-repression’ schema, Foucault entitled his course at the 
Collège de France ‘Society must be defended’. Now, faced with the gen-
eral friability of all of us, how can we defend ourselves from the impact 
of affective capitalism and its digital practices? Can we put forward a 
differential, local knowledge which, as Foucault said, ‘owes its force only 
to the harshness with which it is opposed by everything surrounding it’?
TS The politics of Tarde’s somnambulist can be found in two 
places. The first is in the capricious force of imitative encounter; 
in the affective contagions that spread through the fog. Right-
wing ideas and emotions can sometimes spread like wild fire. In 
the wake of the Woolwich murder we expect to see much more 
of this. The second requires an intervention into the vital forces 
that link example to example. What is perhaps needed is inter-
ference; not a counterimitation, but a nonimitation that breaks 
down the flow of certain fascist inventions: a deterritorialization. 
In effect, the somnambulist needs to wake up!
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Many have seen both kinds of politics manifested in network 
cultures. Social media encourages both intervention and sleep-
walking. To this extent, I am concerned that the to and fro of 
e-petitions on Facebook and Twitter can also have an entropic 
effect on protest. Again, it seems to soak up desire rather than 
deterritorializing it. I wonder therefore if Tarde’s vitalist imita-
tion can replace Reich’s Orgone as an anti-entropic force. Un-
like Reich, Tarde was not a binary thinker. He positioned the 
irrationality of biological desires and seemingly rational in an 
inseparable in-between space. Microsociology becomes a mix-
ture of visceral experiences, mechanical habits, and an illusion 
of self that is not locked away, but vividly etched with the suggest-
ibility of the Other. It is in this multilayered culture that desires 
become appropriated by social invention. Quite often, it seems, 
these inventions take on a fascistic dimension: rural, city, youth, 
family, as Deleuze saw microfascism everywhere! So we still need to 
focus on resisting all forms of fascism, but trying out nonimita-
tive interferences rather than taking counter positions. 
A small, but perhaps significant interference that we have 
seen recently is the Railway pub in Southend in Essex. It was 
once known as the BNP (British National Party) pub. They used 
to meet there I’m told.(3) The pub has certainly become Other. 
We recently saw a bouncer threaten to eject someone for a rac-
ist comment. Now it is a haunt for local artists, musicians and 
one would hope a shadow of a different kind of Essex people. 
It plays host to leftwing film nights and union meetings. What 
is more interesting is that the pub is not a middle class comfort 
zone by any means, but the middle classes are beginning to visit. 
Whether or not this or any other cultural hub can really grow 
into something that can intervene in the kind of popularist som-
nambulism we see in Essex is of course circumspect, but as a site 
of nonimitation the removal of the BNP it seems like an interest-
ing place to explore. What kinds of deterritorialization occur in 
these places? What new people might emerge?
Notes
1.  The Bullingdon Club is a secret society dining club exclusive to stu-
dents at Oxford University. The club has no permanent rooms and is 
notorious for its members’ wealth and destructive binges. Membership 
is by invitation only, and prohibitively expensive for most, given the 
need to pay for the uniform, dinners and damages. PM Cameron, Lon-
don Mayor Johnson and Chancellor George Osborne were all mem-
bers, as well as the financer Nathaniel Philip Rothschild.
2. In a speech to the Tory party conference on Wednesday Oct 10th 2012, 
British PM David Cameron promised to ‘spread privilege’ of the kind 
he enjoyed growing up as he vowed to make the country one of aspira-
tion.
3.  There is currently an EDL pub in the town.
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Crowds vs publics, Ukraine 
vs Russia, the Gaza crisis, the 
contagion theory and netica
a dialogue with Tony D. Sampson
by Rares Iordache
@ #hibridmedia magazine (2014)
Rare  Iordache: After EuroMaidan to the conflict between Ukraine 
and Russia. This event increased his covering and it transformed into a 
genuine war. When I think at EuroMaidan I make a comparison with 
Indignados, the protests in Spain. There are several distinctions, but the 
contagions and their spreading caught my attention. Tell me, what do 
you think were the contagious objects in this case? Another interesting 
thing is epidemiography, a term used by John Postill. This one is also in 
connection with viral phenomena and the contagious objects.
Tony D. Sampson: What is the difference between Spain and 
Ukraine? What tips the contagiousness of one protest into revo-
lution and civil war while the other fizzles out? Although there 
have been analogous patterns emerging in recent years – beauti-
fully portrayed in John Beieler’s big data application (despite its 
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obvious weaknesses) – I’m not sure there’s one concrete object 
or set of viral objects determining what goes viral. In Virality I 
asked what we might learn from Gabriel Tarde. In terms of rev-
olution we need to look beneath the spreading of mere belief 
systems (ideologies) to how desires are given release or inhibit-
ed by invention. The object of desire is always belief; meaning 
that the biological and social mingle at the point where desires 
are appropriated by social inventions. We perhaps need to think 
through the interwoven relations established here between the 
desire for change and inventions of old hierarchies, revolution-
ary crowds, mobs, mass protests alongside mediated publics and 
electronic networks. Tarde’s proto-media theory also provides us 
with a familiar distinction between publics and crowds. Crowds 
have been progressively usurped by mediated publics. On one 
hand, crowds have something of the animal about them. They 
are not easily led. If you want to win a revolution you probably 
need an animal on your side. On the other hand, the new pub-
lics appear1 to be better informed by the new media, but are in 
fact more easily controlled; mainly as a result of the distances the 
increasingly mediated flows of information open up between 
connected subjects. There is, I suppose, less need to join a crowd 
as a source of information. This marks the beginning of press 
baron power and manufactured mass audiences. Old crowd the-
ories suggested that the violent irrationality of crowd power was 
just about enough to prevail over old aristocratic hierarchies. 
Prevailing revolutionary movements have historically relied on 
some level of violence – the muscle of the mob; usually spilling 
out of the poorer neighbourhoods and storming the palaces. So 
what difference can a network make? Take Beieler’s protest map 
again. A tipping point may well correspond with the wide-scale 
uptake of the Internet. Indeed, there are echoes of crowd theory 
evident in some of the popular ideas about network contagions 
today. The BBC broadcast a documentary a couple of year’s back 
fundamentally claiming that Facebook caused the Arab Spring. 
Governments take these claims seriously too. They see social me-
dia as a threat.
But is a network like a crowd? Things are complex. There are 
networks in crowds and crowds in networks, but a network only 
seems to have revolutionary potential if it can tap into the vio-
lence of an actual crowd; a crowd prepared to put its life on the 
line for the cause. Indeed, I am growing a little sceptical about 
the threat posed by social media. The problem for protesters 
in most western European countries is that they are still coun-
tered by a docile public led by corporate media and bourgeois 
politicians. When the students got out of hand during the fees 
protests in the UK most of the public seemed to turn against 
them, welcoming their suppression. Others remained blissfully 
distracted by their diet of celebrity gossip, football transfers, and 
TV talent shows. Social media provides an alternative; it acts as 
a vent for protest, of course. It has an influence on discursive 
1. See John Beieler’s map: https://vimeo.com/115366102
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formations and interacts with the actions of crowds. But it’s a dis-
traction too. The extreme police violence played a role in the de-
mise of the student movement, but they didn’t close down their 
accounts. The stuff that generally trends on these networks does 
not appropriate the desire for political change, but rather in-
dulgences a craving for joyful encounters – entertainment, sex, 
love, scandal, and fun, or as Olga Goriunova argues, utter idiocy. 
Perhaps there’s revolutionary potential in this stuff, but how that 
works I’m not sure. For every FB posting encouraging action on 
the streets there seems to be thousands of stupid cat pictures. 
It’s also important to note that contagions are not inherently 
radical. Contagions can be very conservative. As Barbara Ehren-
reich points out, the only English ‘revolution’ was founded on 
the spreading of a Calvinist belief system that opposed the kind 
of festivities and carnivals that we might usually associate with 
the animality of radical protests. As Beieler’s map problemati-
cally illustrates the contagion could be an Occupy or Tea Party 
protest… Perhaps networks are a hybrid crowd-public or ersatz 
crowds that lack the animality of actual crowds. We cannot storm 
the Bastille with tweets alone! The crowd needs to become the 
brutal muscle that intertwines with network sloganing. So yes, 
any attempt to produce epidemiographs of protest movements 
studying the interaction between network and crowd is very wel-
come.
R.I.: I try to establish a triad between media – archaeology, cyber-in-
telligence and philosophy of information. We can start this discussion 
from the particular case of network archaeology. At this moment, beside 
the impact of flow information and of his transgression, I can talk about 
a kind of ethics of information. In fact, how we use the information in 
cyberspace. This issue will give his quality. We are able to set up a balance 
between the quantity and the quality of information via Luciano Floridi. 
I define this ethics as (n)ethics because all is about functionality. In real-
ity, Netica is a software program developed by Norsys Software Corpora-
tion. Its purpose is to make a network more intelligible to us. Everything 
relies on a set of algorithms. So, what are your first thoughts about this 
triad and his rethinking based on (n)ethics?
T.D.S.: Media archaeology is very appealing; not least because 
it helps us to think up ways by which we can rummage through 
the archives of media invention without placing the constraints 
of a discipline on the researcher. As Erkki Huhtamo and Jussi 
Parikka put it, media archaeology needs to go against the grain 
of almost everything. It’s a nomad. So I think any attempt to tri-
angulate it needs to keep this in mind. If it’s to work well then 
the archaeology needs to perhaps loosen up the ethics. This is 
what Parikka’s mapping of noise and Genosko’s fairly recent 
book on communication theory do. Most technical histories of 
Shannon and Weaver regard them as having brought noise un-
der control, but there is of course an archive of accidents cap-
tured in, for example, collections of computer viruses and glitch 
music. So perhaps one ethical stance would be, in this case, a 
110 111
treatment of noise not simply grasped as the enemy of informa-
tion, but something that has communicative potential beyond 
fixed ethical positions. Netica looks like a fascinating example 
for media archaeology. Thanks for pointing it out. It would be 
really interesting to know how Bayesian networks integrate noise 
in logical circuits of a belief diagrams. For my part I’d also be 
interested in the extent to which these predominantly cognitive 
decision-making diagrams cope with the emotions, feelings and 
affects involved in reasoning? Is there a line of flight between 
Netica type programs and the concerted effort to integrate emo-
tions into machine learning? I assume there is.
R.I.: The conflicts between Israel and Gaza. Any discussion about 
this event is a viral phenomenon, it is clear, and it is a form of manip-
ulation. An informational one. Where are the affections, where are the 
contagious or viral objects?
T.D.S.: What kind of viral phenomenon is this? There is a 
swelling of the protest movement resulting from emotional en-
gagement with this horror. There is a crowd forming. The death 
of innocent people, many of who are children, will act as a pow-
erful emotional contagion. We can barely dare to watch this 
cruelty unfold. But what influence are these protests having on 
governments? There were a million stop the war protesters be-
fore the invasion of Iraq. I can only think that the hitherto fail-
ure of the government here to halt arms sales or more strongly 
condemn Israel’s asymmetric slaughter of innocents exhibits a 
kind of political autism at the heart of the establishment here. 
To prioritize arms sales and support the blockade of Gaza in fa-
vour of this slaughter is obscene. The most effective contagion 
will most likely be the spreading of revenge in the Middle East 
for the death of so many innocents. The actions of the IDF and 
their arms suppliers in the west are producing an epidemic of 
avengers. This will be a crowd that will be willing to put its life on 
the line. It will be networked too.
R.I.: You wrote Virality: Contagion Theory in the Age of Networks, 
a book which transposes the virality in the social field. You rethink Tar-
de’s ideas mixing this spectrum with deleuzo-guattarian structures. It’s 
more than a Tardean recovering. Besides these influences, what is your 
theoretical support for your research?
T.D.S.: The project began with an interest in the potential of 
computer viruses – how these anomalous codes might provide 
an open alternative to the type of closed information spaces we 
find within proprietary software systems. In many ways that re-
mained part of the focus, but it expanded outwards to look at vi-
rality in relation to social theory and the history of crowd theory 
in particular – moving through Tarde, Le Bon, Freud, Milgram, 
Deleuze and Guattari and ending up with network science, af-
fective contagions and marketing. The open system of the viral 
electronic network was in some ways transposed to the openness 
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of the contagious self-other relation of a more generalized social 
network. Instead of finding a new age of contagion, I found that 
contagion had always been there.
If I am to look back at it now and summarize I would say that 
the project’s main philosophical point was to collapse techno-
logical, social and biological distinctions. It tries desperately not 
to side with deterministic thinking. It focuses on the insensible 
degrees between conscious and nonconscious states, affective 
and representational states, volition and mechanical habit… I’m 
not sure how successful that effort was though?
R.I.: You are in connexion with Romanian project Bureau of Mel-
odramatic Research? What do you think about Romanians researchers 
and projects? 
T.D.S.: My visit to Bucharest was a fantastic experience – one 
of the best invites since publishing Virality. The discussions I 
had there with various people provided me with lots of new ide-
as about my next project on neuroculture. I still follow BMR’s 
work and was luckily enough to meet up with Alina and Florin 
in London last year. Indeed, one of the most valued books in 
my collection is their little pamphlet called End Pit. It’s a great 
read. Knowing that the project coincided with the protests in 
Turkey at the time makes it all the more fascinating. Protest art 
as interference or accident; a mixture of performance, affective 
art and politics.
R.I.: The cyberspace is filled with anomalies, contagious objects, vi-
ruses and viral phenomena/ objects. So, in this context, are media ecolo-
gies the most important things for our cyberspace? At the same time, what 
do you think about an ecology based on semantic web?
T.D.S.: Well, yes, it’s these objects, processes and inventions, 
as Matt Fuller argues, that make up the world, synthesize it, block 
it, and make new worlds available. To discount the anomaly from 
this world is senseless, as we argued in The Spam Book. There 
might be many attempts to introduce intruder detections and 
immunological nets, to weed out the weeds, but the potential of 
the anomaly to spill out and infect is always there. I’m not sure 
about the semantic model of the web. I wonder how much of the 
anomalous will figure in automated machines reading of data? 
What threat does it pose to anonymity too? I suppose going back 
to what I have said already, it is the anomaly that might help 
actualize the network into a crowd; its becoming animal. The 
tendency is, it seems, to always drift toward a conservative stabil-
ity founded on the fear of the other (human and nonhuman). 
What we need is nomadic novelty to take hold and deterritorial-
ize these territories of prejudice.
R.I.: Tell me a few words about your current and future interests, 
research or writings.
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T.D.S.: I’m on sabbatical at the moment working on a few 
projects. I’m writing a book on neuroculture. This will explore 
the rise of the neurosciences and the impact it has on nomadic 
thought through various essays on the brain in relation to con-
trol, work and art. I’m also collaborating with various people. 
Along with the performance artist, Dean Todd, I’m developing 
on what I’m calling dystopian media theory. I’m also working 
with Jairo Lugo from University of Sheffield on a project that 
revisits Tardean media theory. We are interested in the extent to 
which the contagions of social media affect editorial decisions 
and content.
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